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FOREWORD
The 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS 05)
introduced the concept of the four challenges—
traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive.
However, since the strategy’s publication in March 2005,
little has emerged in the way of specific amplification
of these concepts. Reference to the challenges is prolific
in both formal and informal defense deliberations. Yet,
there has always been some need for greater richness
and granularity in their description and application in
defense strategy and policymaking.
For three of the four challenges, the wait is over.
This monograph describes the foundational substance
of the traditional, irregular, and catastrophic challenges
as they were conceived at the working-level during
development of NDS 05. Lieutenant Colonel Nathan
Freier, one of two working-level strategists responsible
for conceptual development of NDS 05, examines these
challenges and their implications in some detail. In the
process, he also introduces what he terms the “hybrid
norm”—the routine state of nature where key aspects
of multiple challenges combine at once into complex
hybrids.
Lieutenant Colonel Freier’s focus on irregular,
catastrophic, hybrid, and traditional challenges, while
omitting a fuller description of disruptive challenges, is
intentional. It stems from an early conclusion by NDS
05’s working level framers that, while irregular-cumcatastrophic and hybrid resistance and friction were
increasingly more likely and more dangerous than
most prospective traditional challenges, the existence
of substantial traditional capacity in some key regions
continued to complicate U.S. strategic calculations.
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The disruptive challenge, on the other hand, remained
an important, but also a speculative line of strategic
inquiry that was neither operative yet nor likely to be
operative for some time.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish
this important and timely work. It will increase
understanding of recent foundational changes in DoD’s
strategic orientation.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
After the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the
war against Afghanistan’s Taliban “government,” and
the fall of Baghdad, the Secretary of Defense chartered
a comprehensive review of the “transformational”
defense strategy outlined in the 2001 Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR 01). The review resulted in
the 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS 05). QDR
01’s defense strategy was, in a number of respects,
overcome by strategic circumstances. Thus, NDS 05
was a necessary and timely adjustment to changes in
the strategic environment’s foundational conditions.
NDS 05’s development process gave birth to a novel
description of the strategic environment—a view that
is only imperfectly reflected in the Pentagon’s now
ubiquitous “quad chart” and its abridged description of
the traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive
challenges. The “quad” challenges and NDS 05’s quite
general description of the defense-specific response to
them had a pronounced effect on the prevailing defense
outlook and culture. This is particularly true with
respect to the aperture used to examine the strategic
environment and the lexicon employed to describe it.
Those who framed NDS 05 saw competition with and
resistance to the United States as endemic, persistent,
and increasingly irregular-cum-catastrophic or hybrid
in character. They believed that widespread, defenserelevant resistance to the United States was a natural
by-product of American primacy as well as a palpable
devolution of the reach and effectiveness of some
sovereign governments. In short, some discrete strategic
challenges would arise from purposeful resistance—
predictable systemic antibodies to singular American
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superpower. Others would originate in environmental
discontinuities triggered by globalization and the
attendant dissolution of key aspects of effective
sovereign control. Regardless of origin or purpose,
however, most would be decidedly less traditional in
their prevailing character, and all were certain to test
American primacy in unique ways.
Particularly germane to NDS 05’s working-level
strategists was the rising likelihood and strategic impact
of irregular-cum-catastrophic and hybrid challenges.
In their view, these would threaten American interests
more consequentially than any combination of likely
traditional challenges. This view held that some
opponents acted with others against the United
States. Others acted alone according to their interests.
Some shared the common goal of limiting American
influence. Few, however, enjoyed a common vision for
strategic outcomes.
Though uncoordinated and at times competing,
all of these competitors and competitive forces would
combine in their strategic effect. In still other instances,
the environment itself—un- and under-governance,
weak or failing political order, and, at times, even
natural or human disaster, would inhibit successful
pursuit of American objectives. Considering the range
of prospective security challenges on the strategic
horizon, it was clear that most would exhibit defenserelevant characteristics or have defense-relevant effects.
However, few would be vulnerable to defense-specific
solutions alone.
Contending with all of these forces required DoD
to orient on fundamentally different strategic priorities
than those dominating the first decade and a half of
post-Cold War experience. Those developing NDS
05 believed that strategic costs and setbacks would
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accumulate in real and profound ways if the United
States failed to adjust. In short, failure to meaningfully
account for changes in the environment would
ultimately limit American freedom of action and
fundamentally jeopardize American great power.
From the perspective of those developing NDS 05,
it was increasingly clear that the United States was
more likely to “die by a thousand cuts” than it was to
succumb to a peer opponent in a sudden traditional
military reversal. In this environment, DoD could no
longer afford to limit its utility to military competition
and conflict with traditional state rivals.
Instead, NDS 05’s framers believed that the United
States should be prepared to secure American position
and interests in an environment marked by persistent
irregular, catastrophic, and hybrid resistance and
friction. Mounting evidence suggested that traditional
American military superiority (transformed or not)
was necessary but not sufficient for success in an
environment rife with defense-relevant but not always
defense-specific challenges.
NDS 05’s working-level strategists believed that the
United States was increasingly assuming strategic risk
in areas where history had proven it most vulnerable.
The United States was now operating inside a band
of constant, unrelenting resistance and friction where
a range of discrete competitors tried to limit U.S.
influence through a variety of cost-imposing strategies.
The United States had consistently demonstrated its
enormous capacity to dispatch with military competitors on traditional battlefields. It had not, however,
done so in the face of determined irregular resistance.
Further still, if the United States was only just now at
the front end of an extended period of active resistance
and conflict, it was difficult to predict how it would fare
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materially, politically, and psychologically over time.
It was increasingly likely that the United States and
its armed forces would confront an array of capable
nonstate and state competitors under conditions of
considerable strategic and operational ambiguity
where success and failure are often very difficult to
define.
In reality, the environment would never universally
conform to the pre-conflict, war, and post-conflict
model DoD had long pegged its relevance against.
In DoD’s prevailing, traditional worldview, it ramps
up military capabilities, fights high-intensity combat
engagements, and then cedes primary responsibility
for final conflict resolution to other U.S. Government
(USG) agencies. Now, however, DoD has become
elemental to a constant whole-of-government effort
to manage consequential competition and resistance
perpetually. The important and timely articulation
and socialization of the four challenges was meant to
accommodate DoD’s deliberate adjustment to this new
reality.
Articulation of these challenges also was
intended to change the decision space for senior
defense policymakers and to force DoD as a whole
to more thoughtfully consider its role in a world
populated by unrelenting, disaggregated, defenserelevant challenges to American influence. Perpetual
competition and friction in this world are often, at
their core, nonmilitary in origin and character. While
any single manifestation within it has defense-relevant
components, very few are either exclusively or even
primarily solvable through defense-specific means.
This is particularly true to the extent that resistance
and friction are more irregular, catastrophic, or hybrid
in character.



This more complex challenge environment demands
that American strategists nimbly apply the nation’s
diverse instruments of power in those combinations
likeliest to render decisive, enduring outcomes. Clearly,
this requires more than the DoD and its resources
alone. Nonetheless, DoD was the first to recognize the
increased scope and complexity of the environment’s
constituent hazards. Thus, it bears significant
responsibility for translating the key implications of
these hazards into concepts suitable for wider USG
consumption. Likewise, DoD must itself adjust to the
environment’s unique demands and simultaneously
lead more comprehensive government-wide change in
this regard. It will be some time before the interagency
adjusts to the new (or better understood) strategic
reality. In the mean time, DoD must compensate for the
wider American government’s halting recognition of
the environment’s fundamental transformation and, at
a minimum, help it correctly frame the most important
security- and defense-relevant choices.
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STRATEGIC COMPETITION AND RESISTANCE
IN THE 21st CENTURY:
IRREGULAR, CATASTROPHIC, TRADITIONAL,
AND HYBRID CHALLENGES IN CONTEXT
For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength
enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination,
or by confederacy with others, that are in the same
danger with himself.
Thomas Hobbes1

INTRODUCTION
In late 2003—after the attacks of September 11,
2001 (9/11), the war against Afghanistan’s Taliban
“government,” and the fall of Baghdad, the Secretary
of Defense chartered a comprehensive review and
revision of the “transformational” defense strategy
first outlined in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR 01).2 QDR 01, though scarcely 2 years old, was
overcome by events. In the wake of 9/11 and 3 years
of persistent irregular conflict, the strategic ground
shifted in Washington. The most influential defense
and security policymakers revisited and changed their
prevailing assumptions concerning the nature of threat
and hazard in the international system.3 A strategic
course correction was essential. It was necessary both
to respond effectively to the obvious terrorist challenge
but more importantly, to focus the nation’s principal
national security institution against what was certainly
an oncoming era of persistent irregular, catastrophic,
and hybrid resistance and friction to American great
power (see Figures 1 and 2).4



Security Environment
… Four Challenges
Office of Force Transformation

Irregular

Catastrophic

Higher

Those seeking to erode American
influence and power by employing
unconventional or irregular methods
VULNERABILITY

(e.g., terrorism, insurgency, civil war and emerging concepts like
“unrestricted warfare”)

Those seeking to paralyze American
leadership & power by employing WMD
or WMD-like effects in unwarned attacks
on symbolic, critical or other high-value
targets (e.g., 9/11, terrorist use of WMD, rogue missile attack)

Likelihood: very high; strategy of the weak
Vulnerability: moderate, if not effectively checked
Lower

Likelihood: moderate and increasing
Vulnerability: unacceptable; single event could alter American
way of life

Traditional

Disruptive

Those seeking to challenge American
power by instigating traditional military
operations with legacy and advanced
military capabilities

Higher

Those seeking to usurp American power
and influence by acquiring breakthrough
capabilities

(e.g., sensors, information, biotechnology, miniaturization on the
molecular level, cyber-operations, space, directed-energy and other
(e.g., conventional air, sea and land forces and nuclear forces of emerging fields)
established nuclear powers)
Likelihood: Low, but time works against U.S.
Likelihood: decreasing (absent preemption) due to historic
capability-overmatch and expanding qualitative lead
Vulnerability: unknown; strategic surprise puts American security
Lower at risk
Vulnerability: low, only if transformation is balanced

LIKELIHOOD
No hard boundaries distinguishing one category from another

Figure 1. The “Quad Chart” Circa Spring 2004.5
Defense Strategy

Today’s Security Environment
Higher

Irregular

VULNERABILITY

 Unconventional methods adopted and
employed by non-state and state
actors to counter stronger state
opponents. (erode our power)
(e.g., terrorism, insurgency, civil war, and
emerging concepts like “unrestricted warfare”)
Lower

Catastrophic

 Acquisition, possession, and possible
employment of WMD or methods producing
WMD-like effects against vulnerable,
high-profile targets by terrorists and rogue
states. (paralyze our power)
(e.g., homeland missile attack, proliferation from a state
to a non-state actor, devastating WMD attack on ally)

Traditional

Disruptive

 States employing legacy and advanced
military capabilities and recognizable
military forces, in long-established, wellknown forms of military competition and
conflict. (challenge our power)

Higher

 International competitors developing and
possessing breakthrough technological
capabilities intended to supplant U.S.
advantages in particular operational
domains. (capsize our power)

(e.g., conventional air, sea, land forces, and
nuclear forces of established nuclear powers)

(e.g., sensors, information, bio or cyber war, ultra
miniaturization, space, directed-energy, etc)
Lower

LIKELIHOOD

No hard boundaries distinguishing one category from another

Figure 2. The “Quad Chart” Circa Fall 2004.6
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By mid- to late 2003, direct challenges from extreme
Islam and a violent Middle East were the most obvious
manifestations of consequential environmental change.
Indeed, by September 2001, it was already clear that
the United States and various Islamic extremist groups
would collide violently for the foreseeable future.7
However, though the most compelling immediate
challenges emanated from the War on Terror,
contemporary terrorist and insurgent threats did not
constitute by themselves the sum total of the gathering
hazards certain to confront the United States over time.
Even before 9/11, many concluded that the persistent
threat from violent Islamists was only one of myriad
challenges complicating the nation’s strategic horizon.8
Until 9/11 and in spite of this recognition, however,
the American national security establishment failed
to adjust its culture, structures, biases, and strategic
orientation to the environment’s already vast and
mounting demands. Strategic complacency marked
the 10 years spanning the fall of the Soviet Union and
al-Qai’da’s emergence as a consequential competitor.
American success in the Cold War hardened the
national security elite against meaningful and necessary change.9
The development phase of the 2005 National Defense
Strategy (NDS 05) gave birth to a novel description of
the strategic environment. This view is only imperfectly
reflected by the oft-maligned and admittedly over-used
Pentagon “quad chart” (for two early versions of the
quad chart, see Figures 1 and 2).10 NDS 05 was not a kneejerk reaction to either the 9/11 attacks or the difficulties
encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rather, it was a
carefully conceived and necessary change in strategic
direction from the path outlined in QDR 01. Indeed,
though not published until March 2005, the inaugural
National Defense Strategy was largely complete by


January 2004.11 Fourteen months of bureaucratic
staffing passed before its publication.12 Throughout
this period, the strategy’s abstract characterization of
the environment’s principal challenges and hazards
remained largely uncontested by those in the national
security bureaucracy exposed to it.13
Those responsible for developing NDS 05 at the
working level concluded early on that the character
of strategically significant security competition with
and friction against the United States had changed
fundamentally after the Cold War. Yet, in the
intervening years, DoD failed to adequately reflect or
account for this change in its strategic planning. DoD
strategists further believed that the previous QDR,
released in September 2001, did little to address this
omission. Indeed, their intention that the new NDS
rest on and proceed from a more robust rendering of
competition with and resistance to the United States
drove subsequent work on the strategy as it matured
and as it was vetted across DoD.
Through NDS 05, DoD began to assess and appreciate on-going environmental change more realistically
and judge the relative significance of that change for
future defense policy. Unlike QDR 01, the 2005 strategy
was not just a vehicle for articulating transformational
policy aspirations. Instead, it was a mechanism for
adapting DoD’s culture to more effectively manage
the defense-specific response to persistent resistance to
American influence. To be sure, there is a great deal of
truth to the argument, advanced by some critics, that
NDS 05—like most post-Cold War defense-relevant
public policy—is heavy on concept and light on detail.
In spite of its obvious shortcomings, however, NDS 05
did have a pronounced effect on the prevailing defense
culture, particularly with respect to the aperture used



to examine the environment and the lexicon employed
to describe the environment’s principal challenges.14
DEFENSE-RELEVANT CALCULATIONS
IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD
The course of history between 9/11 and late 2003
provided a tragic but perversely necessary call to
action for the American defense establishment. It laid
the foundation for DoD’s overdue adjustment to a
security environment quite different from the one it
was originally designed and postured to confront. As
one of NDS 05’s two principal working-level strategists,
the author believed at the time that, without significant
change in strategic perspective, complex 21st century
challenges would overwhelm a defense department
still adjusting to seismic shifts in the environment
and its constituent hazards. NDS 05’s framers made
a simple and compelling argument—the character
of the strategic environment’s most meaningful
security challenges shifted fundamentally after the
fall of the Soviet Union. They concluded that the most
consequential, defense-relevant challenges would
be those exhibiting an irregular, catastrophic, and
hybrid character; not those traditional military threats
common to a previous era (See Figures 1 and 2 above).15
QDR 01 clung to the latter (albeit under the guise of
transformation) while NDS 05 moved decisively in the
direction of the former. In short, unconventional forms
of security and defense-relevant competition and
resistance were fast supplanting traditional military
challenges as dominant concerns for the DoD. Further
still, while much of this competition and resistance
might be purposeful and violent, a great deal of it
would also be increasingly nonstate and nonmilitary
in origin and character.


To those drafting NDS 05, strategic-level contests
of an irregular and potentially catastrophic nature
would be consistently more likely and over time
increasingly more consequential than most traditional
military challenges. They believed that irregular
challenges represented one end of a single continuum
with more dramatic and costly catastrophic challenges
occupying the opposite extreme. In their view, these
two challenges blurred as consummate irregular actors
persistently sought to upgrade their capacity to inflict
sudden paralysis on the United States to effect favorable
strategic outcomes more rapidly. Likewise, both the
combination of mounting irregular and catastrophic
challenges as well as the continued existence of
substantial traditional capability indicated that active
challenges would often blend into complex hybrids.
Not only would irregular and catastrophic challenges
merge, but at times, they would also combine with or
be underwritten by a state or state-like competitor’s
traditional military capacity. Clear throughout, however, was the idea that all consequential actors—state
and nonstate—were moving away from traditional
military rivalry as the principal forum for competition
with the United States.
In the author’s opinion, the defense establishment
lost some important nuance and meaning associated
with the challenges during subsequent policy debates.
In short, the “quad chart” is simply not by itself
an adequate description of the emerging strategic
environment envisioned by NDS 05’s framers at the
outset. They had a more sophisticated concept of
competition, resistance, and hazard in mind than that
commonly communicated by or understood within
the simple now familiar PowerPoint design. In true
Washington fashion, defense consumers gave short



shrift to understanding the strategic-level implications
of the four challenges. Instead, most instantly jumped
to translating their impact on discrete budget and
acquisition priorities.
The treatment herein proceeds from a workinglevel perspective. It aims to add more richness and
substance to descriptions of irregular, catastrophic,
and traditional challenges while, introducing the idea
of hybrid challenges more explicitly. Along the way,
the author intends to identify some key implications
for future defense and security policy. For the reader,
the obvious gap in this discussion is a fuller description
of the disruptive challenge.16 While the future
disruptive challenge is an important line of inquiry, it
is nonetheless beyond the scope of this analysis. Suffice
it to say, those responsible for developing NDS 05 (and
their DoD leadership) saw the disruptive challenge as
prospective—even speculative—and, thus, worthy of
prudent hedging. However, they did not consider it an
imminent or active threat over the near- to mid-term.17
Conversely, this monograph’s emphasis on the relative
rise of irregular, catastrophic, and hybrid challenges
proceeds from the conclusion that these were all active,
persistently evolving, and long under-appreciated in
the defense community. To NDS 05’s working-level
strategists, this necessitated fundamental changes to
DoD’s strategic direction and trajectory.
The intent here is not to provide a comprehensive
“sense of the defense bureaucracy” on NDS 05 in its final
form. Nor, for that matter, do the arguments advanced
here claim to necessarily reflect the perspectives of
the most senior defense policymakers on either the
strategy as published or its depiction of the strategic
environment. The views presented here are, however,
consistent with those of working-level strategists
responsible for developing NDS 05. This monograph


only claims to represent their views on the strategy’s
conceptual foundations, particularly as they pertain
to characterizations of the environment and its most
pressing hazards. Admittedly, some of this is clearer
both with the passage of time and some substantial
physical separation from the daily crush of the defense
bureaucracy.
Revolution in Military Affairs or Devolution in the
Character and Origin of Strategic Competition?
In the fall of 2003, NDS 05’s framers concluded that
dynamic forces of global change were cultivating and
unleashing a matrix of complex strategic challenges
to the United States and its interests.18 Further, they
believed that the defense establishment was ill-suited
to contend with most of these challenges effectively.19
The opportunity to influence DoD’s path in this regard
came with NDS 05. Strategic conditions since 9/11
created an atmosphere within which defense strategists
could reexamine de novo key changes in the character
of defense-relevant competition and resistance.
Between 9/11 and commencement of work on NDS
05, the strategic environment proved more complex
than previously articulated or accounted for by DoD.
Suddenly the United States exhibited extraordinary
vulnerability to a range of unanticipated, unconventional politico-security challenges.20 Some (like 9/11)
were sudden and psychologically paralyzing. Others
(like insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan) were more
corrosive and degenerative in character; their cost and
impact accumulating inexorably.
The time between September 2001 and early 2004
was a bellwether period for those charged with defense
strategy development. The limits of American military
power were increasingly apparent. This suggested,


even to traditional U.S. competitors, that there was
value in irregular, catastrophic, and hybrid resistance.
The key questions for the national security and defense
establishments were manifold. Most significantly were
changes in the dynamics of the strategic environment
additive—new challenges added to old—or instead
qualitative—new challenges replacing old? Further,
had a revolution occurred in the character of
competition and hazard in the international system?
And if so, would irregular-cum-catastrophic and
hybrid resistance and their associated costs stake more
of a claim to strategic significance than all possible
traditional challenges? Finally, would DoD’s continued
fixation on the tools and concepts of traditional conflict
ultimately equate to dangerous underpreparedness for
those forms of resistance and friction likeliest to stalk
the United States for the foreseeable future?21
Those drafting NDS 05 believed that the answers
to these questions were sufficiently clear to merit
much greater attention in the new defense strategy.
The strategic environment within which the United
States would defend its people, interests, and position
was changing qualitatively. Meaningful securityrelevant competition with state and nonstate rivals of
consequence was, by and large, migrating away from
the traditional military domain. Thus, violent conflict
would increasingly assume an irregular, catastrophic,
or hybrid character. Finally, continued employment
of 20th century convention to protect, exercise, and
extend American influence would actually undermine
the position and interests of the United States in the face
of decidedly unconventional 21st century challenges.
The world changed after the Cold War. As a result, the
nature and form of competition with and resistance to
the United States changed as well. According to Harlan
K. Ulmann and James Wade, Jr:


(F)aced with American military superiority in ships,
tanks, aircraft, weapons, and most importantly, in
competent fighting personnel, potential adversaries may
try to change the terms of future conflict and make as
irrelevant as possible these U.S. advantages. We proceed
at our own risk if [we] dismiss this possibility.22

QDR 01’s Short Half-Life: The Compelling Need
for Strategic Reorientation.
Upfront, NDS 05’s framers recognized that the
strategic environment and its hazards were more
complex than many appreciated. 9/11 proved that
terrorists operating below the nuclear, biological, or
chemical threshold could inflict catastrophic, paralyzing damage.23 Further, the terrorist challenge itself
proved remarkably resilient. It continued to survive,
mutate, and assault western, and moderate Muslim
interests worldwide.24 Further still, hope for “rapid,
decisive” victory in Iraq and Afghanistan was
instead replaced by the reality of irregular conflicts
of indeterminate length. Each threatened to devolve
into disintegrative, intrastate war, as well as escalate
horizontally across combustible regions.25 North
Korea effectively played the nuclear card by nimbly
balancing its behavior between tepid accommodation
and brinksmanship.26 Pakistan’s A. Q. Khan
demonstrated the dark potential resident in nuclear
entrepreneurship.27 Meanwhile, a host of great and
medium powers effectively balanced against the United
States on key security issues—most notably Iraq. In
doing so, these states also publicly demonstrated the
apparent limits of American political influence.28 In the
Western Hemisphere, the rise of Venezuelan populism
signaled the emergence of viable and potentially radical
political challenges to historic American influence and
leadership in Latin America.29
10

Worldwide, a palpable degeneration of functioning
political order in some key regions became increasingly
apparent. This both manifested itself in un- and
undergovernance, as well as in increasing concern
more generally about the durability of the already
tenuous political order holding some strategically
consequential states together.30 Concerns about
nuclear-armed North Korea or Pakistan, for example,
only intensified when considered in the context of the
fragile political arrangements keeping them intact.31
Likewise, incipient, often radical, discontent with
and resistance to the established governments of the
Gulf Cooperation Council—especially when viewed
in the context of an escalating Iraq insurgency and
an increasingly assertive Shi’a Iran—implied that
45 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and
17 percent of its natural gas might be vulnerable to
sudden, violent disruption.32
None of these gathering challenges tested American
military dominance directly. Indeed, the nation’s most
direct security-relevant challengers chose effective
alternatives to traditional military competition to effect
strategic outcomes in their favor. American interests
were under siege from myriad unconventional, indirect
sources of resistance and friction. In response, traditional U.S. advantages were proving increasingly ineffective against them. The irregular employment of
violence against the United States was common; the
effective mobilization or manipulation of politics
against U.S. interests by a variety of openly hostile,
violent, benign, and at times friendly competitors
even more so. In the face of this, the American defense
establishment appeared chronically under-prepared
for the demands of an environment defined by waves of
unconventional defense-relevant challenges that were

11

increasingly invulnerable to defense-specific solutions.
The United States was indeed a “hyperpower” as
was suggested by a French official in 1999.33 Yet, by
2003-04, alongside quite obvious traditional military
advantages, the United States was also demonstrating
real vulnerability to both alternative forms of
competition and less deliberate systemic instability.
Clever exploitation of this vulnerability was proving
surprisingly effective at limiting American reach,
influence, and freedom of action.34
Thus, by late 2003, defense strategists recognized
that traditional conceptions of risk and hazard were
insufficient for an objective understanding of the new
security environment. This indicated that there was a
critical need for a fundamental revision of the defense
outlook and priorities promulgated in the first months
of Donald Rumsfeld’s tenure as Secretary of Defense.
QDR 01 placed DoD on a strategic trajectory informed
by classical realism. It implied that consequential politico-security competition emanated largely from states
and would rest in large measure on their possession and
retention of decisive traditional military capabilities.35
Where nonstate actors were considered consequential,
it was only in the context of those that managed to
acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or could
pose other catastrophic threats.36
The earliest public expressions of defense policy
by Rumsfeld’s DoD were captured in the Guidance
and Terms of Reference for the 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Review and the subsequent 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Review Report itself.37 In the main, these two documents
articulated a basic position on defense transformation
that had grown throughout the 1990s. Those advocating
this position argued that the United States enjoyed
decided military advantages over all of its likeliest
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state competitors, and that it should seize on an historic
opportunity to guarantee its substantial advantages in
perpetuity through an aggressive high-tech program
of military transformation.38
In the author’s view, architects of the 2001
defense vision overmilitarized the politico-security
challenge. Thus, they weighted their recommended
strategic design heavily toward traditional—albeit
transformational—military superiority.39 According to
the logic of QDR 01, the most strategically significant
challenges would continue to be nails and the solutions
to them increasingly more capable, complex, and
technically advanced hammers.40 In short, nothing
would be novel about the sources of consequential
competition—only the quality of that competition and
the physical address of prospective competitors. States
would continue to be the dominant (if not only) sources
of real strategic hazard for the United States and they
would largely continue to compete with the United
States in ways that were perhaps novel technically and
operationally but not necessarily unrecognizable from
past periods of military rivalry.
QDR 01 was replete with references to anticipated
“asymmetric” competition.41 However, the authors of
QDR 01 appeared to imply that the most significant
security challenges—while “asymmetric” by their
definition—would continue to manifest themselves
most prominently in well-recognized forms of military
rivalry. Principally, these included rising great powers
and rogue states employing ballistic missiles and
WMD to limit American regional influence by holding
the U.S. homeland itself at risk.42 Further still, though
ostensibly founded on the principal of “uncertainty”
and thus trumpeting a “capabilities-” versus “threatbased” approach to strategy, QDR 01 focused implicitly
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on the certainty of future military competition with a
rising China.43 In a word, it was classical realism redux
where the grand strategic dynamics of the nation’s
future looked very much like its Cold War past. This
worldview enabled those influential in QDR 01’s
development to review the strategic landscape and
declare meaningful military competition with the
United States a decade or more in the future. They
therefore sought to hinge future American success on
careful exploitation of a “strategic pause” in meaningful
military rivalry and an attendant opportunity then for
an American “leap ahead” in military capability.44
Those responsible for NDS 05 saw perilous attachment to unreconstructed realism in QDR 01. Among
their core findings was the idea that broad spectrum
American primacy was most vulnerable in domains
lying outside that of traditional military competition.
In their view, QDR 01 failed to acknowledge that real
power and its effective employment no longer adhered
to 20th century realist convention alone. Continued
American primacy relied only in part on retention of
dominant traditional military capacity—transformed
or not. They concluded that traditional military
superiority neither guaranteed broad spectrum
primacy nor was it sufficient to contend with irregular,
catastrophic, and hybrid competition and resistance
effectively. In their view, the politico-security playing
field was at once more complex and in some regards
more level than most understood.
Though meaningful strategic competition and
resistance strayed further and further away from the
traditional military domain, the American defense
establishment continued to bind its relevance to the
narrow maintenance of traditional military dominance
alone. Strategic risk calculation in this regard was
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one-dimensional and binary—not unlike the net and
risk assessments that dominated Cold War strategic
thinking. For DoD, risk was measured and accounted
for in the context of traditional military conflicts with
great or lesser powers. It pegged the department’s
relevance and thus its risk calculations exclusively
against what, in light of years of demonstrated U.S.
military superiority, seemed both the unlikeliest and
the most favorable strategic circumstances for the
United States—purposeful traditional military rivalry
and conflict focused squarely at the jaws of American
advantage.
In reality, the range of consequential actors had
expanded exponentially. In light of obvious American
advantages, all aspiring challengers viewed traditional
military competition or conflict with the United States
as pointless and unnecessary for effective pursuit of
their own discrete interests. From their perspective,
active military competition or open military conflict
engendered enormous—even existential—hazards.
Thus, NDS 05’s framers questioned the validity of
DoD’s strategic trajectory. They further questioned the
utility of the military instrument as it was currently
configured and as they perceived it would be configured after the high-tech transformation envisioned by
QDR 01. Candidate Bush argued in 1999, “The best
way to keep the peace is to define war on our terms.”45
NDS 05’s framers concluded that the American defense
establishment may be redefining “war” perhaps as it
would prefer it to be versus as it was or should become.46
As a consequence, they feared DoD was increasingly
transforming itself, at best, toward limited strategic
utility and, at worst, into strategic irrelevance.
Informed by the currents of post-Cold War social
science and the events that unfolded after 9/11, NDS
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05 proceeded from the hypothesis that consequential
competition and resistance themselves were in the
midst of revolutionary transformation. While there
may in fact be a revolution in military affairs (RMA)
underway, the defense establishment’s adjustment to
a more fundamental transformation in the character
of competition and resistance was more relevant and
important to the relative strategic success or failure of
the United States. The view was that much of the RMA
rested squarely in the realm of traditional competition.
And, further, since the principal aspects of the RMA
continued to be largely dominated by the United
States, traditional military competition was neither
the likeliest nor the most important future challenge to
American primacy.47 As Joseph Nye suggested:
The agenda of world politics has become like a threedimensional chess game in which one can win only by
playing vertically as well as horizontally. On the top
board of classical interstate military issues, the United
States is likely to remain the only superpower for years
to come, and it makes sense to speak in traditional terms
of unipolarity or hegemony. However, on the middle
board of interstate economic issues, the distribution of
power is already multipolar . . . And on the bottom board
of transnational issues, power is widely distributed and
chaotically organized among state and nonstate actors.48

At a minimum, the corporate reevaluation of
defense strategy chartered by Secretary Rumsfeld
necessitated that DoD’s establishment ask and truthfully answer what some might consider impertinent questions given powerful predilections for hightech military transformation focused against future
state competitors.49 Doing otherwise though—ignoring
what some considered real gaps in QDR 01’s analysis
and scope—might prevent or impede essential change
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and leave American interests woefully vulnerable to
the dominant, unconventional security challenges
of the new century.50 Broadly this meant the staid
defense community should undertake an elemental
investigation into the primary challenges to American
interests and DoD’s role in confronting them. By
implication, this necessitated looking beyond the most
immediate challenges associated with the ongoing “war
on terrorism.” It required the defense establishment
instead to examine the broad character of American
position, its costs and hazards, and its rational defense
in a period marked by enormous systemic change.
In advance of DoD’s work, a comprehensive wholeof-government security assessment would have been
providential.51 However, none was forthcoming.
At the working level, three big ideas underwrote
continued work on NDS 05. First, the United States
had entered a period of persistent conflict, resistance,
and friction that would—without some substantial
adaptation—undermine its ability to secure its
interests and position effectively.52 Second, purposeful
state and nonstate rivals would increasingly employ
irregular, catastrophic, hybrid, and perhaps in the
future, disruptive methods against the United States
in order to offset their own vulnerability to traditional
American military preeminence.53 In this regard,
those developing NDS 05 assumed that America’s
most consequential strategic competitors had already
consciously ceded much of the traditional domain to
the United States and had instead opted to compete
in alternative, security- and defense-relevant domains
where the United States had in the past demonstrated
some vulnerability (e.g., domestic and international
politics, American and world opinion, economics,
culture, information, ideology, public safety, etc).54
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Finally, security- and defense-relevant competition
with and resistance to the United States was neither
exclusively confined to the conflict with extreme Islam,
nor was it driven by a future showdown with a rising
near-peer like China alone. Strategic circumstances
were more complex and irreducible than either of these
suggested. The reality was that the United States had
entered an era where conflict on some level was the
norm and peace by most definitions the exception.
NDS 05 then proceeded from a radically different
point of departure than did QDR 01. In late 2003, as
work on NDS 05 began, American great power was
proving much more vulnerable to nonmilitary (but
not necessarily nonviolent) forms of competition and
resistance than commonly acknowledged in public
policy statements.55 To NDS 05’s framers, this nonmilitary competition and resistance was increasingly relevant yet still not meaningfully accounted for in defense
strategy and policy.
The Strategic Environment
and Its Challenges.
To those responsible for developing NDS 05,
the terms traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and
disruptive held particular meanings. It is clear now
that all of these would benefit from a richer more
substantive explanation. As stated earlier, this
treatment is primarily concerned with the evolution of
consequential competition and resistance away from
traditional military threats and toward a challenge
matrix exhibiting an irregular, catastrophic, and hybrid
character. Therefore, the author will devote much of the
following discussion to the latter challenges as workinglevel strategists visualized them in the opening stages
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of NDS 05’s development and its subsequent DoDwide socialization.
NDS 05’s framers believed the security environment
and its hazards held substantial nuance and ambiguity.
But, perhaps not the same level of abject uncertainty
indicated in QDR 01. The world was full of competitors
ranging from the openly hostile and violent to the
inherently subtle, political, but no less unfriendly. The
environment’s many challenges combined in intricate,
often indistinguishable hybrids. Those wishing the
United States or its interests harm sought to do so across
a range of competitive arenas. It appeared many actors
were out to get us; but not all of them were necessarily
out to kill us.
To those drafting the strategy, power still mattered in
the international system. However, they concluded that
employable power neither resided with states alone nor
was it defined only within the context of those classical
instruments of power normally associated with the
world’s most powerful nation-states.56 Further, while
violence or its threatened use remained significant levers
in the competitive relationships between rivals, neither
was sufficient nor necessarily determinative by itself of
favorable strategic outcomes. Finally, they concluded
that many—if not most—defense-relevant 21st century
challenges were, at their core, nonmilitary or would at
a minimum require substantial nonmilitary resources
to confront them effectively. In brief, the United States
had entered a period of substantial resistance and
friction that would require the nimble management of
the U.S. Government’s various instruments of power
in order to drive the most consequential sources of
danger below the threshold of strategic significance.
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The Traditional Challenge—Costly but Familiar.
Before discussing the catastrophic, irregular, and
hybrid challenges in detail it is important to describe the
more familiar traditional challenge in context, as it was
envisioned by the DoD strategists responsible for NDS
05. In the purest security context, the term “traditional
challenge” connotes the employment of “legacy and
advanced military capabilities and recognizable
military forces in long-established, well-known forms
of military competition and conflict” with the United
States or its key strategic partners.57 The traditional
challenge not only includes “the conventional air,
sea, [and] land forces” of competitors or potential
rival states, but also their traditional institutions of
political power and military command and control.58
Thus, it represents the recognized, highly-structured,
and routinized competition between military powers
employing their armed forces to deter, threaten, attack,
or defend themselves.
Use of the phrase “legacy and advanced” in
the context of the traditional challenge is wholly
intentional. It implies to the defense community
that, to the extent an opponent’s “transformational”
or “asymmetric” means fall within the realm of
recognized military capabilities and methods, they
are considered traditional. One man’s “asymmetry”
is another man’s “good generalship” in this regard.
Active preparation for traditional military rivalry and
vigorous prosecution of traditional military conflict
are costly but also familiar endeavors for the United
States.59
Often lost in descriptions of the traditional challenge
is the idea that it also encompasses the nuclear
forces of established (and, the author would argue,
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assumed) nuclear powers.60 By extension, the author
believes the traditional challenge should also include
the wider nuclear and non-nuclear WMD arsenals
of known WMD states. This is particularly true for
those states where convention and capability indicate
that the United States retains significant leverage
and their behavior—though confrontational—is still
rational. NDS 05’s working-level strategists assumed
many WMD states exercised a degree of rational and
responsible control over their WMD arsenals that
some popular conceptions of WMD possession were
rejected. Further, there were traditions, routines, and
conventions governing the disposition and possible
employment of nuclear weapons that would continue
to favorably influence the behavior of well-established
nuclear powers. Combined, these seemed to moderate
the external challenge of some WMD possession and
thus made stable strategic management of the WMD
challenge—in a limited number of instances—more
practicable.
This logic was not intended to imply that extant
WMD arsenals (particularly, in the author’s view,
nuclear and biological weapons) were not key sources
of concern.61 Nor was it meant to accept as fact the
inevitability of wider WMD proliferation. Rather,
NDS 05’s framers believed that a history of restraint
with respect to nuclear weapons and a post-9/11/
post-Iraq environment increasingly intolerant of
WMD misbehavior combined to militate against
the occurrence of overtly hostile or irresponsible
acts certain to provoke a hyper-sensitive American
superpower.62 Further, they believed that many of
the classic levers of state and international power that
successfully moderated behavior during the Cold War
remained operative against traditional state challengers

21

in the post-9/11 period as well. Finally, though
acknowledging prevention and counterproliferation
as national priorities, they believed that once WMD
possession was a reality or an inevitability, efforts to
shape outcomes positively through skillful application
of the broad instruments of power were more likely
to succeed than were forcible efforts to reverse
acquisition or eliminate capabilities altogether. This
is particularly true if one adds the proviso ‘without
incurring unacceptable increased strategic risk’ to more
force-oriented approaches to counter-proliferation.
In the broadest sense, this view of ‘traditional
challenges’ was never intended to wholly discount as
insignificant the military threat from rival or potential
rival states. Nor, for that matter, did NDS 05’s framers
overlook the prospect of future tensions between the
United States and competitors boasting some significant traditional capacity. However, work on NDS 05
operated from the assumption that meaningful state and
nonstate rivalry moved on, in practical terms, toward
what were to prospective competitors other more cost
effective and risk-informed approaches. Toward that
end, those developing NDS 05 believed most rival
improvements in traditional military capacity were
complementary to hybrid competitive strategies vis-àvis the United States. Thus, they further believed that
the most significant and consequential competition was
occurring largely in alternative, nonmilitary domains.
This neither ignored unprovoked state-sponsored
violence as a potential challenge nor did it indicate that
the United States could forgo investment in those military capabilities necessary to offset future traditional
military competition or conflict. It did, however,
indicate that the risk calculations of most state
competitors identified traditional military competition
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with the United States as cost prohibitive and
astrategic. To NDS 05’s framers, strategically significant
violence originating from a hostile state would likely
be surreptitious, indirect, and unconventional in
character; and therefore, less vulnerable to redress
through traditional American military responses.63
They believed that transnational and substate
competitors had already internalized these ideas, long
since migrating active resistance to the United States
into irregular, catastrophic, or hybrid domains.
Given this view of traditional challenges, fresh
perspectives on the prospects for military conflict
were warranted as well. Clearly large, capable states
continued to maintain substantial traditional capacity.
This implied that the United States would have to
continue to account for traditional military challenges
in its strategic and operational calculations. Yet, given
that meaningful politico-security competition was
moving away from traditional military rivalry, it also
implied that the United States must learn to manage
residual traditional challenges differently than it
had in the past. New irregular-cum-catastrophic and
hybrid challenges would require increasing attention
and resources.
Those developing the defense strategy acknowledged that the United States would have to maintain
sufficient military capacity to defeat multiple state
competitors simultaneously in a traditional context.
However, given recent American military performance
and the concept of “defeat,” as it was commonly
understood in mainstream defense convention, this
was not a particularly high bar.64 Thus, they determined
that large-scale traditional military conflict constituted
neither the likeliest nor the most dangerous politicosecurity challenge for the United States.65 Therefore,
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it seemed intuitive that American strategists should
be prepared to assume some risk in the traditional
domain in order to offset real vulnerability to irregularcum-catastrophic resistance. This was particularly
disquieting to the military departments who staked so
much of their reason for being on underwriting success
in major combat actions against traditional military
opponents.
If it occurred at all, NDS 05’s framers believed
traditional military conflict would originate from one
of three precipitating triggers—rival miscalculation,
accident, or American preemption/prevention. They
assumed that even the most capable state challengers
would avoid purposefully initiating traditional
hostilities as a matter of policy, as any deliberate
provocation would clearly occur on terms favorable
to the United States. Further, they concluded that
this would remain the case for as long as the United
States maintained its decisive overmatch in traditional
warfighting capacity.66 They assumed that traditional
military conflict—should it occur at all—would proceed
from circumstances often outside the immediate control
of rivals, but often within the proximate control of the
United States. Maintaining this advantage was still
considered a key component of future defense policy.
With respect to miscalculation, a rival state might
again underestimate American resolve over what they
perceive to be a peripheral U.S. interest—à la Kim il
Sung in 1950 or Saddam Hussein in 1990. Therefore,
they could cross unforeseen U.S. redlines and, as a
result, elicit an American military response. Likewise,
future American decisionmakers could underestimate
foreign resolve. In doing so, they might trigger a
military response previously unaccounted for in U.S.
strategic calculations. Though the offended state is
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likely to be universally less capable than the United
States, honor and the instinct for self-defense may
trump more rational alternatives to war.
On the issue of accidental war, inadvertent tactical
or operational confrontation between American forces
and those of a potential rival; unintentional foreign
or American encroachment on a sensitive interest;
or a fundamental misreading of strategic warning
could all result in unwanted military confrontation.
Each, without deliberate counteraction, could lead
to uncontrolled escalation that ends in traditional
military hostilities. Past behaviors or events that under
the right conditions might have triggered “accidental
war” include the aggressive quasi-war between rival
Cold War submarine fleets; the accidental bombing
of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade; the U.S.-Russian
stand-off at the Pristina Airport; and finally, the SinoAmerican P3 incident over Hainan Island. All of
these illustrate how relatively insignificant tactical
confrontations under the right circumstances might
result in “accidental war” between the United States
and a rival state.
Finally, the recent preventive war in Iraq indicates
that traditional conflict might also result from
deliberate American policy choices. Whereas obvious
U.S. traditional overmatch gives rival states substantial
pause when considering initiation of traditional
hostilities, the opposite might be true for American
decisionmakers. The Iraq War is at once demonstrative
of the substantial U.S. capacity for prosecution of
traditional military campaigns; the obvious temptation
to employ that capacity against vulnerable rivals; and
the inherent susceptibility of traditional American
military advantages to purposeful irregular resistance
and civil disorder in the “post-maneuver” phase of
military operations.67
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The American experience in both Iraq and
Afghanistan may temper a future president’s interest
in forcible regime change and extended stabilization.
In both instances, the United States demonstrated its
capacity to overthrow an unfavorable status quo but
failed to demonstrate the requisite follow-on capacity
to rapidly and effectively establish or restore a stable
new status quo in its place.68
This view of traditional military conflict leads to two
conclusions. First, the United States has the resident
capacity and defense culture to effectively mitigate most
risk originating from residual traditional competition.
Its enormous experience and success against illbehaving, conventionally-minded state challengers,
its continued devotion to military innovation, and
the great potential of American technological knowhow, all indicate that the United States can maintain a
decisive edge in traditional warfighting capacity and
mitigate most future risk in this regard through prudent
hedging. Thus, the United States is likely to affect the
course and outcome of conflicts rooted in the traditional
domain on its terms for the foreseeable future. In 2006,
Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Ryan
Henry concluded similarly in Parameters:
The U.S. military of today is the dominant world power
when it comes to traditional challenges: state-on-state
warfare . . . in a regularized battlespace—the classic
competition of firepower and maneuver. In the course of
investing heavily in the capabilities to meet traditional
challenges, and as successive generations of combatant
commanders have absorbed lessons from the battlefield
. . . we have become the preeminent asymmetrical player
in this kind of warfare.69

The second conclusion is that the United States
cannot currently guarantee this same level of confidence
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with respect to conflicts that are inherently irregular,
catastrophic, or hybrid from the outset or assume one
of these alternative forms as they mature. One lost
aspect of NDS 05—now implied, but once more explicit
in the text—is the idea that even the most traditional of
military engagements might ultimately devolve into
protracted irregular campaigns as occurred in both
Iraq and Afghanistan.70 Throughout the remainder of
the monograph, the author will devote a great deal
of attention to the broad implications of this second
conclusion.
The Catastrophic Challenge—Likely and Paralyzing.
To NDS 05’s framers, that which separated a
“traditional” conception of WMD possession from
WMD possession constituting a “catastrophic
challenge” was the presence of rational, responsible,
and positive control in the case of the former and a
lack thereof with respect to the latter. A suddenly
destabilized or ungoverned traditional nuclear power,
for example, is instantly an enormous catastrophic
challenge. Likewise, partial loss by a traditional power
of effective control over some employable weapons
of mass destruction to a rogue or separatist domestic
actor suddenly presents the United States and the
international community with an urgent catastrophic
challenge.71 Further, known terrorist possession of
employable nuclear or biological weapons constitutes
without any qualification an immediate catastrophic
challenge.72 Yet, to NDS 05’s framers, the catastrophic
challenge included more than just weapons of mass
destruction or their use. They considered some nonWMD mass-casualty and mass-effect terrorism
catastrophic challenges as well—particularly in light
of al-Qai’da’s 2001 attacks inside the United States.
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Use of the adjective “catastrophic” was troubling
to some. Critics, for example, observed that a major
regional war or an extended and quite violent guerrilla
conflict in a key strategic region could, by popular
conception, be considered “catastrophic” as well.
The short answer as to why strategists settled on the
adjective “catastrophic” versus any other word is
simply that the term conformed with conventional
wisdom on the topic of “catastrophic terrorism”—an
idea that had come to the fore in the previous decade.73
As the author has already described and will describe
further in upcoming paragraphs, the catastrophic
challenge, as envisioned by those crafting NDS 05,
included more than just extreme forms of terrorism.
However, their wider view was the product of a
reasonable extrapolation of the already well-known
concept of catastrophic terrorism. In the 1998 report
Catastrophic Terrorism: Elements of National Policy,
Ashton Carter, John M. Deutch, and Philip Zelikow
capture the essence of the catastrophic challenge in
what is now a chillingly accurate foreshadowing of the
post-9/11 world:
Readers should imagine the possibilities for themselves,
because the most serious constraint on current policy
is lack of imagination. An act of catastrophic terrorism
that killed thousands . . . of people and/or disrupted
the necessities of life for hundreds of thousands, or even
millions, would be a watershed event in America’s history.
It could involve loss of life and property unprecedented
for peacetime and undermine American’s fundamental
sense of security . . . Constitutional liberties would be
challenged as the United States sought to protect itself
. . . by pressing against allowable limits in surveillance
of citizens, detention of suspects, and the use of deadly
force . . . Like Pearl Harbor, such an event would divide
our past and our future into “before” and “after.”74
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By late 2003/early 2004, when the catastrophic
challenge was defined initially for the defense
bureaucracy, it became, “acquisition, possession, and
possible employment of WMD or methods producing
WMD-like effects against vulnerable, high-profile
targets by terrorists and rogue states.”75 Use of the
phrase “rogue state” was in hindsight imprecise.
To those crafting NDS 05, the catastrophic challenge
described deliberate or inadvertent loss of positive,
responsible control over significant WMD capabilities;
their use or threatened use; or the employment or
capacity for employment of non-WMD methods or
capabilities likely to generate WMD-like effects. Thus,
the term “rogue” by itself is more suitable to any
definition of catastrophic challenge than is the more
restrictive phrase “rogue state.”
Rogue implies the broader concept of possession
or use by a leader or group “no longer obedient,
belonging, or accepted and hence not controllable or
answerable.”76 A renegade, seditious substate actor
who gains possession of all or part of a state’s nuclear
arsenal and whose intentions are either known and
hostile or unknown would by definition present a
sudden and quite complicated catastrophic challenge,
for example, in the same way that an irresponsible
or irrational state actor would. Thus, again from a
working-level perspective, a “rogue state’s” possession
of employable WMD and ballistic missile capabilities
does not necessarily constitute a catastrophic challenge.
The “rogue state” in question may still exercise
rational, responsible, and positive control over its
WMD capabilities, and the United States may continue
to exercise substantial ‘traditional’ leverage over its
behavior as well.
Like the subjective distinctions NDS 05’s framers
made between traditional and catastrophic challenges,
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there were equally subjective distinctions made with
respect to exactly what constituted “catastrophic” as
well. Earliest descriptions of the four challenges were
displayed graphically on different versions of the now
familiar quad chart (See Figures 1 and 2).77 Though
some phrasing changed throughout 2004, there was
very little change in meaning. The challenges were
also first publicly described in the text of an obscure
March 2004 Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC)
report.78 One of the first public versions of the quad
chart was included in a briefing by DoD’s then Director
of the Office for Force Transformation entitled Security
Planning and Transformation.79 This version represents
an abridged description of the four challenges as
originally conceived by NDS 05’s working-level
framers—naturally adjusted to the preferences of
senior defense leadership.
Common to all graphic depictions of the
catastrophic challenge is the idea that it exists with the
intent or capacity to “paralyze [American] power.”80
Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
Ryan Henry later reiterates this in his Parameters’ piece
published in early 2006.81 In this regard, understanding
two key terms and their relationship is critical—that
of catastrophe and that of paralysis. The catastrophic
challenge, to NDS 05’s framers, implied having the
capacity to elicit “(a) sudden, terrible calamity” (on
the United States or its interests), as Webster’s defines
catastrophe, and, therefore, inflict on the United States
some “severe impairment of activity,” as paralysis
is partially defined by American Heritage.82 In this
regard, the previous citation from Carter et al. is also
instructive.
These nuanced perspectives are especially important when thinking about the catastrophic challenge
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in its non-WMD context. Al-Qai’da’s demonstrated
capacity to exact catastrophe through non-WMD
means combined with increasing uncertainty about
the surety of some existing WMD arsenals and the
responsible stewardship of WMD know-how drove
those developing NDS 05 to conclude that catastrophic
challenges were both increasingly likely and
prospectively paralyzing in their effect on the United
States.83
They believed the catastrophic challenge fell into
one of two categories. You either knew a catastrophic
challenge when you saw it—à la 9/11. Or you knew
it when your mind’s eye conceived of it; it was both
plausible and bad; and its effects would be nationally or
internationally paralyzing—e.g., nuclear or biological
terrorism against major American metropolitan centers.84 On 9/11, 19 hijackers employed four domestic
jetliners as precision-guided weapons, attacked three
“vulnerable, high-profile targets” in Washington and
New York, and killed almost 3,000 Americans.85 The
widespread political, security, economic, social, and
cultural ramifications of the attacks were in a word
catastrophic. Clearly, a small yield nuclear device
employed in lower Manhattan would kill or injure
more and do a great deal more physical damage than
did the 9/11 hijackers.86 Yet, both the effects of 9/11 and
the assumed effects of a nuclear attack demonstrate the
not dissimilar prospect of “sudden, terrible calamity”
of substantial strategic consequence exacting a “severe
impairment of activity.”
The catastrophic challenge merits some further
extrapolation as well. For example, national security
decisionmakers should assume that simultaneous,
coordinated suicide attacks—dispersed across
the United States, targeted strategically for mass
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psychological effect, and employing terrorists similar
in number to 9/11—could also paralyze American
life through sudden calamity. And this would be
true in spite of the fact that the net casualties and
physical damage associated with each individual
attack would be substantially lower than the two
obviously catastrophic examples provided above. The
2004 BRAC report referenced earlier also hints at the
prospect of catastrophic attacks on infrastructure that
conceivably involve little or no immediate loss of life
but nonetheless prove calamitous and paralyzing to
the United States over all. The BRAC report observed:
Elements of the U.S. national infrastructure are vulnerable
to catastrophic attack. The interdependent nature of the
infrastructure creates more vulnerability because attacks
against one sector—electrical power grid for instance—
would impact other sectors as well. Parts of the defenserelated critical infrastructure are vulnerable to a wide
range of attacks, especially those that rely on commercial
sector elements with multiple single points of failure.87

One final extrapolation is also quite important.
Admittedly, some prospective natural or human
disasters merit some deeper examination as
catastrophic challenges. These occur or arise in
the absence of any hostile volition or intent but
nonetheless exhibit “WMD-like effects” in their wake.
An honest and comprehensive post-tsunami/postKatrina appraisal of catastrophic challenges would
acknowledge that some “acts of God,” as well as the
sudden catastrophic failure of some hazardous human
functions should be included in the concept as well.
Hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, volcanoes,
widespread blackouts, nuclear or industrial accidents,
pandemics, and, even future meteor strikes could
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prove strategically dislocating for important states or
regions. This naturally includes the United States.
One need only recall the Southeast Asian Tsunami
(2004) and Hurricane Katrina (2005) to see how the
political, economic, and physical security of key U.S.
interests might be threatened by devastating natural
or human disasters in ways that would warrant wellconsidered defense-specific responses. For certain,
defense-relevant implications of catastrophes like these
mostly lie in the realm of consequence management,
security, and post-event risk mitigation. However,
catastrophes like these do have clear strategic-level,
politico-security implications that should be considered
thoughtfully in advance, within the context of key
American interests.
The Irregular Challenge—Persistent and Corrosive.
‘Irregular challenges’ too, as they are currently
conceived, would benefit from an expanded discussion
of their origin and development. Neither the description
contained in NDS 05 nor those circumscribed definitions
outlined in various “quad charts” referenced earlier
represents the fullest accounting of the irregular
challenge as originally conceived.88 All of these provide
important components of the concept. None, however,
renders a complete, comprehensive description. In
one of the 2004 briefing charts cited earlier, irregular
challenges are described as “(u)nconventional
methods adopted and employed by nonstate and state
actors to counter stronger state opponents.”89 In this
context, irregular challenges seek to “erode [American]
power.”90
NDS 05 similarly describes irregular challenges as
those “employing ‘unconventional’ methods to counter
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the traditional advantages of stronger opponents.”91
Consistent with briefing chart references to an erosion
of American power, NDS 05 concludes, “Irregular
opponents often take a long-term approach, attempting
to impose prohibitive human, material, financial, and
political costs on the United States to compel strategic
retreat from a key region or course of action.”92 The
strategy itself lists “terrorism and insurgency” as
illustrative of purposeful irregular challenges, while
2004 briefing charts consistently identify “terrorism,
insurgency, civil war and emerging concepts like
‘unrestricted warfare’” as their examples.93
NDS 05’s framers believed that the United States
would persistently encounter purposeful resistance,
as well as less focused residual, environmental friction
that would present direct challenges to compelling national interests.94 This is foundational to understanding
the irregular challenge as originally conceived. The
strategy’s framers posited that purposeful resistance
arises when the United States employs its enormous
capacity and influence to secure core interests and, in
doing so, encroaches—intentionally or otherwise—on
the vital or survival interests of other strategically
consequential actors. As a corollary, they anticipated
that even latent American power—viewed as a potential challenge by prospective opponent’s—will trigger
some preventive resistance in an attempt to shield or
secure key interests prior to their being threatened by
the focused attention of the United States.
Use of “encroachment” when describing U.S.
actions and “resistance” or “defense” to describe
actions by U.S. opponents that include terrorists,
insurgents, criminals, and rival states is not meant to
cast American foreign and security policy in a negative
light. Nor for that matter should it be taken to suggest
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some moral equivalency between, say al-Qai’da, the
Mehdi Militia, or the governments of Iran or Syria
and the United States. Rather, it is intended as clinical
recognition that the United States will—intentionally
or otherwise—challenge the core interests of other
consequential actors (legitimate, illegitimate, hostile,
neutral, and at times, friendly) in ways that will
engender some violent and nonviolent resistance. In
short, it will both pick fights intentionally and trigger
fights as a result of who it is, what it does, and what it
represents.
Those opponents who believe that their core interests are threatened by the United States will employ
what they perceive to be the most effective tools at
their disposal to push back against U.S. encroachment
and secure for themselves the most defensible, interestbased position. In this regard, effective resistance relies
on employment of those instruments that convention,
culture, and capability indicate will have both the
greatest impact and greatest likelihood for success.95
Given enormous traditional American advantages—
across all instruments of power—NDS 05’s workinglevel strategists believed that determined competitors
will increasingly seek to employ innovative,
unconventional forms of resistance and competition
against the United States to offset their own obvious
vulnerabilities. Though NDS 05’s drafters considered
many irregular-cum-catastrophic approaches to be
morally abhorrent, they nonetheless also recognized
them as on some level rational. This indicates simple
recognition that there are rivals who believe that the
ends justify often unspeakable means when physically
resisting the United States. It further indicates that a
wider universe of violent and nonviolent irregular
innovations will stalk American great power and offer
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determined competitors a range of attractive, costimposing alternative strategies.
To those developing NDS 05, purposeful irregular
resistance would assume many forms. They believed
some would follow the conventions and norms of
civil politics, international relations, and legitimate
political discourse. Thus, they would remain confined
to economic, political, cultural, and social resistance as
well as some forms of “soft balancing.”96 Others would
be more violent, corrosive, and ultimately, degenerative
in effect. Persistence was common to all. If successful,
all could erode American power, national will, and
real influence over time through the imposition of
increasing physical, psychological, and political cost.
In the extreme, those irregular opponents who are
unconstrained by conventional norms and are seeking
more immediate strategic outcomes will attempt to
paralyze the United States and its partners through
episodic catastrophic attack. This will be discussed in
greater detail in the next section.
The most aggressive forms of purposeful irregular
resistance naturally include but are not limited to
terrorism, insurgency, civil war, and other nonmilitary
modes of violence. However, as indicated above,
the challenge universe also includes a range of less
violent but no less hostile or potentially damaging
forms of confrontation as well. Therefore, reference to
“unrestricted warfare” under the rubric of the irregular
challenge in various 2004 briefing charts was, at least at
the working level, intentional.97 However, the concept
of “unrestricted warfare” was not included in the
abridged definition of irregular challenges included in
NDS 05.98
“Unrestricted warfare,” as described in February
1999 by Chinese theorists Qiao Liang and Wang
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Xiangsui, surveys alternative forms of competition
and conflict available to those confronting a great
power like the United States.99 NDS 05’s framers
believed many forms of irregular resistance could
(if strategically targeted, persistently pursued, and
competently employed) exact costs on the United States
that in real terms would approach or surpass those
commonly associated with traditional military conflict
and war.100 Here Qiao and Wang are instructive. They
observed:
War which has undergone the changes of modern
technology and the market system will be launched
in even more atypical forms. In other words, while
we are seeing a relative reduction in military violence,
at the same time we definitely are seeing an increase
in political, economic, and technological violence.
However, regardless of the form the violence takes, war
is war. . .101

Unrestricted Warfare was clearly intended to be
a theoretical blueprint for meaningful resistance to
dominant traditional military power. In it, Qiao and
Wang argued that “the new principles of war are no
longer ‘using armed force to compel the enemy to submit
to one’s will’ but rather . . . ‘using all means, including
armed force, military and nonmilitary, and lethal
and non-lethal means to compel an enemy to accept
one’s interests’.”102 Qiao and Wang described a range
of “nonmilitary war operations.”103 They contended
these would all be “waged with . . . greater frequency
around the world.”104 These alternative forms of war
included trade war, financial war, ecological war, and
a new terror war that they suggested would involve
“the rendezvous of terrorists with various types of
new, high technologies.”105 Qiao and Wang described
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a host of other, more speculative, nonmilitary forms
of purposeful resistance that could, from the author’s
perspective, present the United States with significant
future irregular challenges originating from a number
of hostile competitors or competitive alliances.106 They
concluded:
Faced with a nearly [infinite and] diverse array of
options to choose from, why do people want to enmesh
themselves in a web of their own making and select
and use means of warfare that are limited to the realm
of force of arms and military power? Methods that are
not characterized by the use of force of arms, nor by
the use of military power, nor even by the presence of
casualties and bloodshed, are just as likely to facilitate
the successful realization of the war’s goals, if not more
so.107

In the author’s view, purposeful irregular resistance
to the United States involves the unconventional
employment of violence, political agitation, social
mobilization, and political or economic “assault” at
the international, national, or subnational levels; all
specifically targeted at undermining the quality and
scope of American reach and influence, the security of
core American interests, and the stable functioning of
key U.S. allies and partners. In the case of the latter,
determined competitors may target vulnerable partners
upon whom the United States is uniquely dependent
for some key support. This resistance involves the
range of “nonmilitary war operations” described by
Qiao and Wang. However, as partially argued earlier,
the most common and defense-relevant approaches
in the near- to mid-term might be insurgency,
terrorism, coup, civil war, popular strike or revolt,
mass civil disobedience, criminality, assassination,
and purposeful civil violence. For the time being, these
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may be far more evident than some of the more novel
approaches described in Unrestricted Warfare.
DoD’s working definition of irregular warfare
(promulgated within an August 2006 Joint Forces
Command study) in large measure captures the essence
of purposeful, violent irregular resistance as envisioned
by those responsible for NDS 05’s development. The
draft DoD definition begins, “Irregular warfare is a
form of warfare that has as its objective the credibility
and/or legitimacy of the relevant political authority
with the goal of undermining . . . that authority.”108 The
intent is not physical defeat of the stronger opponent,
but rather, persistent erosion of the stronger opponent’s
physical and political influence and authority.
The working-DoD definition of irregular warfare
does not, however, capture the totality of the irregular
challenge – especially its less violent or less purposeful
manifestations. As for the less purposeful, NDS 05’s
framers did envision consequential irregular challenges
originating in residual, environmental friction. At
the outset, these adverse ‘environmental conditions’
may have very little to do with the United States
directly, but nonetheless become persistent obstacles
to the uncomplicated pursuit of its enduring interests
worldwide.
Just as purposeful resistance from a range of sources
will challenge uninhibited retention of American
position and influence, their secure maintenance also
demands that the United States contend with this
less focused, but no less corrosive and potentially
debilitating, environmental friction as well. The
greatest challenge in this regard, according to NDS
05, stems from “the absence of effective governance”
that, according to the strategy, “creates sanctuaries for
terrorists, criminals, and insurgents.”109

39

In the author’s view, there is also a larger, more
comprehensive and fundamental challenge to the
sovereignty and stable functioning of some key
governments lurking on the strategic horizon. NDS 05
hints at this when it observes, “Many states are unable,
and in some cases, unwilling, to exercise effective
control over their territory or frontiers, thus leaving
areas open to hostile exploitation.”110 While this may
be true, an even more fundamental concern about
governance revolves around the ability of a handful
of key states to remain intact as sovereign entities
and to retain functional, sovereign control over their
constituent territory and populations as a whole. In
short, if the physical and virtual reach of legitimate
authority is increasingly in jeopardy in some important
states, then the very existence of some of those states as
functioning political units is also in greater peril than
many currently appreciate.
This more fundamental governance challenge
is reflected in the work of John D. Steinbruner. In
Principles of Global Security, Steinbruner describes
what he implies is an under-recognized challenge
to the foundations of effective governance that, left
unattended, threatens the stable functioning and order
of the international system itself. While not necessarily
presenting immediate, direct threats to the physical
security of the United States, the challenge, as described
by Steinbruner, could, if uncontained, threaten what
he calls “global legal order” and, by implication, core
American interests.111 Steinbruner observes:
There is reason for concern that the process of
globalization might generate contagion effects powerful
enough to undermine the legal foundations of the
international economy and of its constituent societies
and that sudden surges of civil violence might occur both
as a manifestation and as a contributing cause of that
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pathology. . . . Human societies could not indefinitely
tolerate any sanctuary for the gestation of a process
that seriously threatens the operating rules necessary to
sustain the global economy.112

From the perspective of NDS 05’s framers, collapse
of functioning order in a strategically consequential
state or region would directly threaten core American
interests in manifest ways. This is particularly true for
those states where stable functioning of the established
order is uniquely important to the continued security
and prosperity of the United States and its population
or that of a key strategic partner. This idea is explicitly
embedded in key passages of NDS 05. For example,
in the discussion of “Key States,” NDS 05 observes,
“(I)f adverse economic, political, and demographic
trends continue, large capable states could become
dangerously unstable and increasingly ungovernable,
creating significant future challenges.”113 Among the
assumptions, it observes, “Crises related to political
stability and governance will pose significant security
challenges. Some of these may threaten fundamental
interests of the United States.”114
In response to this particular form of the irregular
challenge, the defense strategy argues that the United
States may have to “help defend and restore a friendly
government.”115 Later, under the rubric of “denying
enemies sanctuary,” it concludes that the United States
requires the capability “to assist in the establishment
of effective and responsible control over ungoverned
territory.”116 Finally, in the strategy’s description
of “(s)wiftly defeating adversaries and [achieving]
decisive, enduring results,” it underscores the
enormity of the challenge associated with confronting
the “post-maneuver”/post-collapse environment.117
On this subject, the strategy concludes that the
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American military must have the capacity to “[set] the
security conditions [necessary] for enduring conflict
resolution.”118 This includes “extended stability
operations involving substantial combat and requiring
the rapid and sustained application of national and
international capabilities spanning the elements of
state power.”119 QDR 06 seizes on these points in its
new force sizing construct as well.120
By these passages, the strategy’s authors were
not solely implying that “(s)tability operations are
a core U.S. military mission that . . . shall be given
priority comparable to combat operations,” as was
later suggested in DoD Directive 3000.05.121 Rather, by
raising the profile of the irregular challenge as one that
is fundamentally dangerous to the stable functioning
of some key states and under the worst conditions
potentially catastrophic to American security interests,
NDS 05’s framers were implying that the restoration of
functioning legal order in some very important states
and regions may define for the American defense
establishment the most consequential and urgent of its
future strategic challenges. To NDS 05’s framers, this
implied that Security, Stabilization, Transition, and
Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO) may not be (as
popular military conception would have it) civilianled and military-supported ventures that follow
major combat operations but instead national security
ventures of enormous import that supplant major
combat operations in relative importance, investment,
and strategic consequence for DoD.
Though purposeful irregular resistance and
the environmental friction accompanying weak or
collapsing political authority are distinct challenges,
they can, in practice, appear quite similar in character.
For example, terrorists, insurgents, criminals, or foreign
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intelligence services may target the United States
because of its political or military support for unpopular
regimes. Further still, they may do so because of more
generalized opposition to what is perceived to be a
distinctly American regional or global political order.
Likewise, the United States may come into contact
with irregular actors like this in the aftermath of
preventive or preemptive military action. Or, equally
likely, the United States may face determined irregular
opposition as a result of a consequential state’s sudden
collapse and subsequent American efforts to remedy
its consequences. Similarly, civil conflict ostensibly
focused solely against an important foreign government
may emerge as a result of that regime’s relationship
with the United States or simply because of localized
political grievances. The latter may have nothing
to do with American policy but the resultant social
and political instability may nonetheless challenge
American interests fundamentally.
Though the sources or causes of the disputes in
question are quite different, the strategic and grand
strategic impact is similar. One form of the irregular
challenge arises in direct response to American power
and influence; the other originates in the weakness,
failure, or rejection of local political authority. Both,
left unattended, threaten core U.S. security interests.
The strategic costs associated with either source are
corrosive and accumulate persistently over time.122
Thus, the United States ignores each at its peril.
Subsequent discussions of the irregular challenge
within the defense community were from the outset
self-limiting. Much of this is understandable. In the
author’s view, two interrelated issues were decisive
in artificially bounding the discussion of irregular
challenges. The first was expediency. As terrorism
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and insurgency were the topics du jour dominating
the American security agenda at the time and because
they were also subelements of the irregular challenge,
most subsequent discussions of the irregular challenge
and its implications gravitated in their direction. This
occurred at the expense of a deeper more nuanced
understanding of the concept overall. In short, terrorism
and insurgency were transformed themselves into
short-hand for the irregular challenge as a whole.123
Of course, real political and security exigencies
preordained this narrower focus. However, this also
reflects, to some extent, what Michele Flournoy and
Shawn Brimley insist is the tendency for the American
government to be trapped in the “tyranny of managing
today’s crises.”124 This early, near-exclusive focus on
terrorism and insurgency invited some to artificially
limit the irregular challenge concept to a much
narrower set of conditions than NDS 05’s framers
originally intended. Neither the strategy by itself nor
the 2004 briefing charts cited earlier did much to help in
this regard. Each frames the irregular challenge almost
exclusively in terms of purposeful violent resistance
to the United States.125 By doing so, these source
documents steer clear of meaningful consideration
of less purposeful but no less dangerous strategic
conditions like consequential state failure, civil war,
or uncontrolled civil violence not necessarily rooted
in either the War on Terrorism or an unstable Middle
East.
Further still, the focus on purposeful violent
resistance invites some under-appreciation for those
who will confront the United States by choice in irregular, defense-relevant ways that are not necessarily
overtly violent. As the previous discussion has attempted to demonstrate, careful manipulation of local politics
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or economics mixed with the selective, sometimes
subtle, use of political violence might prove to be more
effective than overt uses of physical violence alone. The
latter, after all, is likelier to trigger unwanted American
military responses. DoD leadership, however, should
recognize that although some forms of resistance may
preclude immediate American military responses, the
outcomes nonetheless may have sweeping defenserelevant implications. The author will expand on this
in the upcoming discussion of hybrid challenges.
The strategy’s text itself underwrites a disproportionate focus on the immediate irregular
challenges of terrorism and insurgency. At the
same time, the strategy’s exclusion of concepts like
“unrestricted warfare” and its light treatment of subjects
like undergovernance and state failure in an ‘otherthan-terrorist sanctuary’ context help perpetuate some
of the misunderstanding.126 In hindsight, the author
believes that the strategy would have benefited from
a much more expansive discussion of the governance
and state failure challenge in a context beyond that
associated with the War on Terrorism.
The second key and related issue in this regard
stems from use of the word “irregular.” Once, through
textual representation, terrorism and insurgency
became the sum total of the irregular challenge, it was
relatively simple for those examining the problem
in some detail to replace the term “challenge” with
the more familiar term “warfare.”127 Whole defenserelevant constituencies associated with or interested in
“unconventional” warfare (the land-focused military
services, U.S. special operations forces and their
advocates, joint doctrine writers, military academics,
etc.) were then able to seize on this narrower focus and
thus revert to “conventional wisdom” as it pertained
to irregular unconventional warfare.
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Admittedly, DoD needed to define the irregular
challenge in a unique defense-specific context. QDR
06 and the later work it chartered did do some of this.
For example, QDR 06 acknowledged that, as a matter
of “steady state,” DoD must be prepared to “conduct
multiple, globally distributed irregular operations of
varying duration.”128 Further, it concluded that the
defense department should likewise be prepared to
“surge” DoD capabilities to “conduct a large-scale,
potentially long-duration irregular warfare campaign
including counterinsurgency and [SSTRO].”129 Both of
these conclusions indicate sweeping cultural change
within DoD. The key question is, “Has this cultural
change really gone far enough?”
The “Hybrid Norm.”
The challenges are archetypes. None of the four—
traditional, irregular, catastrophic, or disruptive—exist
now or will exist in the future in pure form. Thus, “hybrid challenges” will remain the norm.130 For example,
even a traditional state challenger will seek to offset
obvious military vulnerabilities through incremental
increases in its capacity to compete in the universe of
“nonmilitary war operations” suggested by Qiao and
Wang. Likewise, as indicated earlier, NDS 05’s framers
believed that meaningful irregular challenges existed
on a single, unbroken, continuum with catastrophic
challenges. In their view, the most consequential among
them—e.g., al-Qai’da and associated movements—
were already complex hybrids, employing irregular
and catastrophic methods interchangeably depending
on circumstances and available resources.131 Thus,
graphically the DoD “quad chart” consistently
implies that irregular and catastrophic challenges are
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increasing in both likelihood and relative strategic
impact. Likewise, the dashed lines separating the four
quadrants were always intended to symbolize the
blending of the challenges and the increased likelihood
of hybrid combinations.132 In hindsight, the hybrid
concept was not as well-communicated in the text of
the strategy as the author would have preferred. After
a brief introduction of the four challenges, however,
the strategy does say the following without specific
reference to the term “hybrid”:
(R)ecent experience indicates that the most dangerous
circumstances arise when we face a complex of
challenges. For example, our adversaries in Iraq and
Afghanistan presented both traditional and irregular
challenges. Terrorist groups like al-Qai’da are irregular
threats but also actively seek catastrophic capabilities.
North Korea at once poses traditional, irregular, and
catastrophic challenges. Finally, in the future, the most
capable opponents may seek to combine truly disruptive
capacity with traditional, irregular, or catastrophic forms
of warfare.133

Three examples illustrating the hybrid challenge
are in order. These are illustrative, and, thus, are
not necessarily by themselves exhaustive in their
representation of the ‘hybrid challenge.’ The first is
a hybrid state or state-like challenger. In many cases,
the hybrid challenge from state or state-like actors
continues to be anchored on their retention of some
significant traditional military capacity. NDS 05’s
framers concluded that maintenance of some substantial
traditional capacity by prospective state or state-like
challengers enables them to engage more effectively
in alternative forms of competition with the United
States—forms also offering a greater chance for success.
Thus, retention or acquisition of traditional capa47

bilities by them—even “transformational” capabilities
or WMD—does not by itself demonstrate intent to
compete meaningfully with the United States in the
traditional military domain. Nor for that matter does
it indicate intent to employ military force to secure
regional or functional objectives they know to be
anathema to American interests and likely to trigger
traditional U.S. military responses.
It may indicate the opposite. The maintenance of
sufficient traditional capacity may enable a hybrid state
or state-like rival to consolidate its current security
position within a perceived or recognized sphere
of influence and hedge against American military
encroachment. Doing so underwrites its freedom
of action and enables it to compete with the United
States in other more favorable domains—e.g., politics,
economics, trade, etc.
What if, for example, Beijing’s substantial
traditional capacity underwrites an alternative, more
irregular approach to the Taiwan issue? What if China’s
military build-up adjacent to Taiwan is not necessarily
intended as direct leverage over outcomes but rather
as an enabler for an indirect political fifth column?134
China’s ability to threaten Taipei and those inclined to
support Taipei with certain military costs may be less
about securing Taiwan through military incursion or
intimidation and more about securing, from sudden
military reversal, political gains achieved through
persistent political agitation and electioneering. Under
even more complex circumstances, China might exploit
future political volatility in Taiwan to cultivate and
mobilize indigenous agitators who share its interest
in reunification and who are willing to employ or
manipulate politics, economics, social activism, civil
disobedience, and limited nonmilitary violence to
realize it.
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That outlined above is illustrative. Paraphrasing
Qiao and Wang, in an era of unquestioned highend American military primacy, state or state-like
competitors are better off avoiding overt military
competition with the United States all together. Those
blessed with patience and time are more likely to shape
long-term political outcomes in their favor by using
common culture and propinquity to their advantage.
Further, they might employ political influence, foreign
direct investment, development aid, humanitarian
assistance, and discrete violence as suggested earlier
in some clever combination to influence the form
and direction of a targeted population’s strategic
choices.135
The purposes and sources of traditional military
violence are easy to recognize. Given American
military preeminence, they are also easy to defeat.
Therefore, the hybrid state or state-like competitor only
employs violence when absolutely necessary—nimbly
avoiding known thresholds for American retaliation—
to shape attitudes, adjust behaviors, or demonstrate
the weakness and vulnerability of an existing, U.S.supported political order. To be cost effective, the
hybrid state or state-like competitor employs violence
surreptitiously, as overt use of traditional military force
crosses obvious U.S. and international redlines, plays
to the traditional strengths of the United States, and is
likely to draw focused and costly American military
retaliation.
Thus, the choice between the battlefield and the
ballot box in this hybrid environment might be a false
one. As determined competitors opt out of meaningful
military competition with the United States, they
increasingly recognize new opportunities to manipulate local, regional, national, and international politics

49

in their favor at much lower cost and without automatically incurring unacceptable levels of physical
vulnerability to traditional U.S. advantages. They may
simply choose to outflank American military might
through politics, toxic populism, and the selective use
of political violence. In this regard, the ballot box might
be the battlefield—war not as politics pursued by other
means but rather politics as war.
Recent events in Lebanon are instructive. Hezbollah
is to many Lebanese a legitimate political party in a
fragile parliamentary democracy. Yet, it is also an
armed militia boasting some significant traditional
military capacity and a terrorist organization known
to be responsible for attacks against Western and
Israeli interests. Hezbollah has also been called “a state
within a state” (and thus, state-like) and is, at the same
time, commonly assumed to be a client of both Syria
and Iran.136 Thus, Hezbollah and its state patrons are
by definition collectively some irregular-traditional
hybrid at a minimum. In this regard, Hezbollah’s
near simultaneous escalation of the physical threat
to Israel and the political threat to Lebanon—at the
alleged behest, inspiration, or acquiescence of one or
both of its state patrons—offers a clear example of a
state-like hybrid challenge undermining key interests
principally through irregular means. Hezbollah’s overt
challenges to Israel’s physical security and Lebanon’s
political stability are underwritten by the veiled threat
of some substantial traditional military cost associated
with direct confrontation of either the client or its
patrons.137
Suspected Iranian intervention in Iraq provides
an equally relevant example. Iran is at once suspected
of both influencing Iraqi political outcomes through
soft infiltration of Iraq’s Dawa and SCIRI parties and
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fomenting civil conflict by providing at a minimum
some material support to Shi’a militias involved in
sectarian violence. This dual track approach allows the
Iranians to undermine American interests and shape
strategic outcomes in Iraq while carefully avoiding
open provocation or direct military confrontation with
the United States.138 The relationship between patron
and client is symbiotic in this regard. The state is an
instrument of the nonstate actor and the nonstate actor
is at the same time an instrument of the state.
The focus of an opponent’s traditional military
strategy vis-à-vis the United States then may not be on
achieving strategic objectives by force of arms. Rather,
the intent may be more subtle. Military strategy and
traditional military capacity—to include some WMD—
may be insurance against intervention. In short, rivals
underwrite alternative forms of irregular competition.
The maintenance of some traditional (or catastrophic)
capacity by the weaker rival promises the potential of
unacceptable physical and political costs on the stronger
competitor—particularly if the stronger competitor
attempts to employ its own traditional advantages to
prevent or reverse unfavorable strategic outcomes.
Note that this does not necessitate the capacity to
defeat the United States on a traditional battlefield.
Rather, it implies the need to maintain that minimum
military capacity essential to drive American political
and military risk calculations toward prohibitive or
unacceptable levels.
In this way, a rival’s traditional military capacity is
not the primary instrument of competition but rather
an enabler for it. Maintenance of traditional military
dominance by the United States then may be necessary
but not sufficient. Securing core U.S. interests against
alternative forms of hybrid strategic competition like
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this implies the need for a more expansive U.S. capacity
to employ politics, information, money, and force
in more nuanced combinations to achieve favorable
strategic outcomes. In short, effecting comprehensive
and enduring results under these circumstances
demands the capacity for real strategic acumen; not
simply the operational art.
This is particularly true if key interests of the United
States—long-considered vulnerable to military attack—
are instead threatened or “seized” by alternative means,
thus leaving traditional American military superiority
irrelevant or illegitimate to prevention or redress of
strategic loss. In cases like this, the question is not,
“Can the United States military effectively restore a
favorable status quo through force of arms?” Rather,
the more important question becomes, “Can the
United States legitimately and cost-effectively employ
military force to secure vulnerable interests, given the
opponent’s chosen form of competition and adopted
strategic course of action?”
A second hybrid example stems from purposeful,
irregular-cum-catastrophic, nonstate competition. As
in the case of the nuanced, state or state-like competitor, the capable nonstate competitor may utilize
similar combinations of culture, politics, identity, and
violence to maximum benefit. Employed effectively
in combination, these can make transnational and
subnational movements successful rivals to the United
States in certain competitive domains and within a
certain politico-security context. This is true in the
absence of any measurable traditional military capacity
whatsoever. These movements can combine political
agitation, social mobilization, active or threatened
irregular violence, their own forms of toxic populism,
and the specter of catastrophic attack to influence
outcomes in their favor.
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Under most circumstances, superior American
military capability can achieve immediate tactical
and operational success with some ease. Yet the
United States has greater difficulty recognizing and
subsequently attacking with its variegated instruments
of power the real locus of consequential competition
and conflict in a transnational or subnational context.
Thus, transient tactical or operational military success
often obscures real strategic vulnerability. The United
States is simply less capable of “sealing the strategic
deal” in the face of irregular-cum-catastrophic nonstate
resistance. It frankly has yet to determine the proper
role, relative contribution, and effective configuration
of American military power when it is confronted with
effective, irregular nonstate competition. And, though
clearly uncertain about how best to employ its military
instrument under these circumstances, the United States
is doubly uncertain, even incapable, of employing its
other—likely more important—instruments of power
nimbly and in effective combination with military
force under all circumstances.139
Effective transnational or subnational competition
is far more ideational, political, socio-economic, and
cultural in its primary orientation than the United
States is either comfortable confronting or likely in its
current configuration to succeed against—particularly
if it employs military power as its sole or primary
instrument.140 Throughout the Cold War, the United
States was content and comfortable competing with
a peer equal. Its defense institutions, structures,
doctrines, and strategy were all programmed to support
great power competition. Today, the United States
finds itself confounded by lightly-armed and loosely
organized opponents that use violence illegitimately;
information and the media indiscriminately; and in
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practice, appear more violent communities of interest
than suitable military rivals. In spite of their obvious
weaknesses, however, these nonstate opponents and
malcontents have proven remarkably equal to the task
of effective competition with the United States and its
range of advantages in military power, resources, and
prestige.
As in the state-centric or state-like examples outlined
earlier, the effective nonstate competitor employs
violence strategically to seed fear, undermine legitimate
political authority, and demonstrate weakness in the
stronger state opponent. Violence is not, however, the
principal mechanism of competition. The war occurs
more subtly in the realm of ideas and perceptions. The
nonstate opponent hopes to make a political, cultural,
and socio-economic narrative compelling to a target
constituency through propaganda, agitation, political
activism, and intimidation. At the same time, he seeks,
through the targeted employment of nonmilitary
violence and irregular resistance, to persistently drive
the physical and political price of effective American
competition toward excessive and increasingly
prohibitive levels.
As described previously, irregular or catastrophic
violence then is not intended to generate physical
defeat of the stronger U.S. opponent. Rather, its intent
is public demonstration of American vulnerability
to unconventional, cost-imposing resistance. This
demonstrated American vulnerability enables weaker
nonstate opponents to contend successfully with the
United States on more favorable terms.
The actual locus of physical violence need not be
proximate to the primary competitive arena either.
Violent demonstrations of U.S. or partner vulnerabilities, may be substantially detached from the real object
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in dispute yet still accomplish their intended purposes.
Under these circumstances, effective communication
of meaningful political messages is far less important
to American rivals than is persistently driving up the
physical, psychological, and political costs of U.S.
activism on the one hand and material cooperation
and support for United States by strategic partners on
the other. With respect to the United States specifically,
irregular opponents recognize that preventing or
persistently increasing the costs of American success
in one functional or geographical arena may affect
U.S. risk tolerance in others. Thus, “once bitten” in an
important but peripheral or optional endeavor, the
United States may find itself “twice shy” when more
critical interests are at substantial, immediate risk.
Recent history is instructive here. The negative
experiences of Vietnam and to a lesser extent Lebanon
and Somalia tempered American willingness to
employ force through the 1990s.141 Further, extended,
resource-intensive peacekeeping missions in the
Balkans undoubtedly affected Bush administration
predilections
regarding
nation-building.142 By
implication then, one should be concerned about the
effect of the on-going Iraq War on future American
strategic decisionmaking. At the outset, the United
States had substantial control over the time, place,
and manner of intervention. Yet, in spite of these
advantages, a sea of subnational, transnational, and
hybrid-state competitors consistently thwart Americanled efforts to stabilize Iraq. How this reality affects
policy downstream is uncertain. However, its impact
will likely be significant.143
Those who argue that consummate irregular actors
like terrorists or insurgents cannot match up with
the United States or its partners on quasi-equal terms
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because they lack both organizational cohesion and a
meaningful political program often miss the point of
the competition itself.144 They are in the same company
as those who consistently cling to the notion that an
unbroken accumulation of tactical military victories
is automatically determinative of future strategic
success.145 An irregular challenger who prevents the
United States from visibly succeeding or drives the
broad costs associated with success to unanticipated
levels creates more operating space for himself and
others determined to vie for primacy over local politicosecurity outcomes against the Americans.
In this regard, past failures against irregularcum-catastrophic opposition may result in American
vacillation, miscalculation, or inaction when more
urgent future circumstances instead demand prompt
responses. Thus, while to many American policymakers
the Iraq War is a “central front in the war on terrorism,”
some of the most active and capable U.S. opponents
likely see it also as an opportunity to bleed the United
States into future self-deterrence elsewhere.146
Sudden escalation of physical violence to catastrophic levels accelerates the perceived intensity of
an irregular conflict in a profound way but does not
change the basic aims of the principal antagonists. The
irregular challenger who ventures into the catastrophic
arena does so to raise the physical and psychological
stakes of the conflict exponentially, while also securing
some legitimacy as an able and —in their view—
rightful opponent of the United States. A successful
catastrophic attack demonstrates—in a very dynamic
and public way—the stronger American opponent’s
obvious vulnerabilities. The dominant opponent, struck
with sudden catastrophic attack, is for a time stunned
in the same way a sloppy, right-handed professional
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boxer might be challenged by a capable, southpaw
amateur. Failure of the more experienced fighter to
keep the aggressive pretender off-balance while, at the
same time, defending against the “lesser” opponent’s
obvious capacity for harm, could result in an early and
surprising knockout or functional surrender through
exhaustion.
Since the sudden, disorienting 9/11 attacks for
example, al-Qai’da-inspired terrorism and political
agitation remain decidedly irregular. However, the
prospect of additional catastrophic attacks raises alQai’da’s political and security profile and significance
to levels previously reserved for the nuclear-armed
Soviet Union. At the same time, 9/11 triggered a chain
of American national security investments—e.g., wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan, counterterrorism campaigns
in Southeast Asia and Africa, increased vigilance and
key site protection in the United States, secret detention
facilities, military tribunals, etc.—that cumulatively
drive the price of effective U.S. competition in the
irregular and catastrophic domains to very high levels.
This is all true 5 years beyond the first and only real
catastrophic terrorist attacks against the United States.
It is fair to suggest that had al-Qai’da not attacked
New York and Washington, the United States may
still be managing the terrorist challenge episodically
at levels it finds costly but tolerable. Under these
circumstances, al-Qai’da and its fellow travelers might
today only be considered strategically consequential
to the extent they threaten the existence of friendly
foreign governments like Saudi Arabia or Pakistan.
Instead, al-Qai’da’s demonstrated capacity to reach
into the United States and the perceived severity of the
9/11 attacks forced American decisionmakers into a
comprehensive campaign focused on some future—as
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yet undefined—endgame with al-Qai’da and a range
of other al-Qai’da-like competitors.
A final illustration of the hybrid challenge
involves the specter of a strategic state’s sudden
collapse. Collapse of a state of some real strategic
consequence is among the most complex prospective
hybrid challenges. The failure or collapse of any
state is tragic; the failure or collapse of some would
prove strategically disastrous.147 Given the trajectory
of globalization and the increasing vulnerability of
some important governments around the world, it is
likely that a state whose stable functioning is uniquely
important to the United States will succumb to its own
structural weakness and collapse. It is equally likely
that the United States will be compelled to respond.148
The threat or damage to American interests and the
degree to which the United States involves itself in
post-collapse remediation efforts varies according to
the affected state’s relative strategic value.149 However,
the prospective SSTRO and horizontal escalation
challenges associated with failure of one or more
of the states that both meet the threshold of unique
importance and demonstrate proclivity for the types of
weakness associated with collapse indicate the United
States should account for this potentiality in its strategic
calculations. In most cases, the burdens on DoD would
be enormous.
In the worst of these collapse scenarios, elements
of the armed forces and police may remain under
coherent command and control and resist intervention.
Agents of the fallen regime—hesitant to dispense
with the old order—may attempt to defend or
restore the collapsed and discredited status quo. Selfinterested criminals and substate militias may carve
out a defensible sphere of influence at the grass-roots
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level, rapidly filling the naturally expanding security
vacuum. Adjacent powers and foreign agents with a
significant interest in the post-collapse order or who
have a substantial interest in sewing wider instability
may intervene directly or indirectly to extend their
influence over outcomes. Repressed constituencies
may seek to exercise newfound freedom. In doing so,
vengeance against agents or perceived agents of the
former regime is likely. Local nationalists may resist
what they perceive to be foreign-imposed political
solutions.
Meanwhile, significant segments of the population
may physically oppose both a necessary international
intervention, as well as an essential and long overdue
rebalancing of indigenous political authority. Further,
angry, lethal extremist diasporas might emerge from
the chaos and export violence to other vulnerable
states and regions. Overlay on this a large, ethnically
heterogeneous population; the presence of employable
WMD; substantial strategic resources like oil or natural
gas; vulnerable constituencies susceptible to mass
migration; transregional ethnic, religious, political or
criminal associations; and a host of other potential
complicators. Combined, these indicate the prospect
of swirling traditional, irregular, and catastrophic
challenges interacting both by chance and design to
create a very complex hybrid security challenge of
enormous geo-strategic relevance.
There are obvious parallels between the above
description and the on-going Iraq War. Indeed, Iraq
may be an archetype (sadly, in microcosm) for the most
complex prospective strategic collapses. Admittedly,
the coalition intervention triggered Iraq’s failure.
However, Iraq’s pre-war disposition and its postcollapse environment provide a useful analog for the
United States as it considers future interventions to
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contain instability and restore functioning order to a
large, important, but failed state.
At a minimum, the United States now understands
that redressing the worst effects of collapse—with
immediate stabilization and subsequent political,
economic, social, and security reconstruction—is
fraught with enormous cost, sacrifice, and risk. Upon
intervention, responsibility for the amelioration of a
failed state’s preexisting vulnerabilities and maladies
falls on the external powers that choose get involved.150
Thus, early understanding of the character and scope
of the challenge is critical.
The key operational difference between Iraq and a
future collapse of equal or greater consequence is the
degree to which the United States controls the time,
place, manner, and mechanism of both the failure of
the victim state itself and the course and conduct of
the subsequent intervention to restore it to a minimum
essential, self-sustaining order.151 Needless to say,
the United States had enormous control initially over
conditions and outcomes in Iraq. This luxury is
unlikely in the future, save for those limited occasions
where the United States might again act preemptively
or preventatively and thus become the principal
mechanism of both collapse and stabilization.152
What should be clear from the wider discussion of
hybrid challenges is that they are collectively neither
solely nor even principally defined by a single actor
employing diverse forms of competition and resistance.
Rather, hybrids are more commonly characterized
by a number of consequential actors who formally,
informally, or accidentally combine to resist American
encroachment, undermine U.S. interests, or complicate
intentionally or otherwise unhindered pursuit of
core U.S. objectives. The state-centric and state-like
illustrations, at the outset for example, suggest that
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the most effective state-based resistance may be by
proxy—particularly when either violence or political
manipulation are involved. By definition, competition
by proxy requires two or more consequential actors
(at least a patron and a client) to agree to collective
opposition.
The nonstate example is also illustrative. That
thoughtful analysts refer to the current jihadist
challenge as al-Qai’da and those “associated with
or inspired by al-Qai’da” is itself instructive.153 The
violent Islamist threat is not monolithic. Rather, it is
a bundle of like but at times distinct challenges. It is
a loose movement—atomized, amorphous, and at
times, competing within and against itself. The mere
description of consequential state collapse underscores
both its varied sources, as well as the diverse forms of
resistance and friction that it would likely generate for
an intervening American great power.
In any hybrid set of circumstances, states might
combine with other states; nonstate entities might
ally with other nonstate entities; states may align
themselves with nonstate actors; or alliances of states
and alliances of nonstate movements might themselves
combine into a networked front of common opposition
and resistance. In the case of strategic state collapse,
it may be even worse—a “war of all against all.”154
Indeed, as the United States discovered in Iraq,
creation of or intervention in conditions of general
collapse makes the intervening power vulnerable to
becoming a party to all sides of a very complicated and
violent competition for political primacy. The potential
permutations are innumerable and should be given
thoughtful consideration.
Yet, just as the diversity of actors is important, so
to is multiplicity of methods and potential realms of
competition. Most actors who look to purposefully
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limit American influence will increasingly do so both
by employing a combination of mutually supportive
methods as well as by doing so across a variety of
physical and functional domains. As suggested earlier,
Baghdad may be a battlefield for Sunni foreign fighters
in Iraq but it is likely not their ultimate objective.
Riyadh and Amman, on the other hand, are very rarely
battlefields but are quite likely still the object of intense
competition for Sunni extremists. Acts of violence in
London, Madrid, or Bali are intended to impact policy
locally and globally. Likewise, demonstrations in Beirut
and political boycotts in Najaf or Basra are focused
both against indigenous political authorities, as well
as the foreign powers that hold substantial sway over
local outcomes.
From the perspective of NDS 05’s framers, state
competitors are largely traditional challengers fast
diversifying into the irregular-cum-catastrophic
and, where possible, nascent disruptive domains.
Purposeful nonstate competitors are by definition
irregular challengers. However, many like al-Qai’da
and its fellow travelers through their own deliberate,
strategic choices are beginning to recognize the value
of catastrophic capability. Further still, to the extent
that nonstate competitors act in common-cause with
state powers possessing some significant traditional
capacity, they too can combine into very difficult
irregular, catastrophic, and traditional hybrids. All
individually or in unison are complex amalgams that
are difficult to untangle. Likewise, the environmental
friction of un- and undergovernance and state collapse
may originate in local weakness and conflict having
nothing to do with the United States or its policies.
Nonetheless, the convergence of compelling U.S.
interests and the prospect of uncontrolled instability
may see these circumstances rapidly evolve into active
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forums for opportunistic, purposeful resistance to
American great power.
Strategic Implications—
INEVITABLE COMPETITION AND RESISTANCE
OR The “Long War”
Critics of NDS 05 correctly observe that the four
challenges (traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and
disruptive) are only really described in the abstract.
This is both true and intentional. In the wake of the
Cold War, traditional military competition for too long
governed strategic decisionmaking in DoD. NDS 05’s
framers believed that early, abstract recognition of real
change in the environment would enable the defense
establishment to thoughtfully reexamine and dispense
with significant portions of conventional defense
wisdom long overcome by strategic circumstances.
The challenges offered defense strategists a different
philosophical lens through which they might assess
the department’s readiness to fulfill its numerous 21st
century responsibilities.
If DoD was to remain broadly relevant, it could not
afford to limit its utility to one narrow slice of the more
expansive spectrum of competition and resistance
that was likely to buffet American great power into an
indefinite future. Thus, articulation of the challenges
was intended to establish a conceptual foundation for
the more detailed bureaucratic calculation that was to
occur during QDR 06. Whether the defense community
either recognized this value or applied it effectively
during the QDR is a separate discussion.
Strategists responsible for NDS 05 would have
ultimately preferred to undertake a more detailed
examination of the environment and its hazards
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through the lens of the four challenges—naming names
and setting real regional and functional priorities as a
result. Still, early abstract recognition of change in the
environment did enable NDS 05’s framers to break
down some conventional conceptions of competition
and resistance. Entrenched defense wisdom saw
competition with the United States in discrete binary
terms—e.g., U.S. vs. China, U.S. vs. al-Qai’da, U.S. vs.
North Korea, etc. Each competitive relationship was
self-contained and, at various stages in development,
each was viewed as one-dimensional—a crisis of
economics, diplomacy, or security alone.
In this framework, meaningful conflict—narrowly
defined by the Pentagon as war—was episodic. War
was the exception; peace and the preparation for war
the norm. According to the dominant DoD narrative,
there were to be distinct periods of pre- and post-conflict
sharply divided by short, intense periods of traditional
warfare. This view saw DoD exercise primacy over
the course and tempo of events in the middle, while
leaving responsibility for the two extremes to others.
This cognitive framework underwrote a classically
realist bias among both DoD professionals and
some key defense intellectuals. The author includes
advocates of the high-tech RMA in the latter category.
This view saw preparation for major regional war and
traditional military rivalry as the raison d’etre of the 21st
century DoD. The most common argument within the
military establishment in this regard was that, whereas
the United States could afford setbacks in what became
the irregular domain, it could not afford the same in a
future traditional military conflict with a rising great
power.
This logic was on one level true and on yet another
dangerously irrelevant. It was a foil with which defense
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traditionalists—even those advocating high-tech
transformation—repelled truly necessary innovation
in the way DoD (and by implication the wider national
security community) thought about consequential
competition and resistance. Few were arguing for the
United States to dispense with its traditional advantages
or its commitment to military transformation. Some—
including those responsible for drafting NDS 05—were,
however, suggesting that traditional military conflict
and rivalry were for the United States at once the least
likely, best understood, and most over-prepared for
set of strategic circumstances on the horizon.
NDS 05’s framers offered an alternative worldview.
They saw competition and resistance as endemic
and perpetual. They were the products of American
primacy and its natural opponents as well as real
devolution of effective governance and responsible
sovereign authority over key areas of the world. Some
competitors in this environment acted in concert with
others against the United States. Others acted alone.
Some shared a common interest in limiting American
influence but enjoyed no common cause with respect
to either methods or strategic outcomes. Thus, their
actions, though uncoordinated and even at times
competing, would effectively combine in effect. In
some cases, as suggested earlier, the environment itself,
without specific volition or intent, resisted effective
pursuit of core U.S. objectives. However, regardless
of origin or purpose, the secure maintenance of
American position would likely rely on simultaneous,
strategic management of all of these competing
sources of resistance and competition. Though much
of the competition and resistance was nonmilitary in
character, all of it had defense-relevant implications.
Purposeful resistance, by definition, is more
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predictable and thus, more manageable. To the extent
purposeful resistance is grounded in the conventions
of traditional military rivalry, it is even more so. Less
conventional irregular-cum-catastrophic resistance is
somewhat predictable and potentially manageable,
but certain to be less so given recently demonstrated
U.S. vulnerability. The idea that the environment
itself might self-generate consequential challenges like
endemic under-governance and strategic state collapse
is a relatively new consideration in DoD calculations.
Likewise, the idea that natural or human disaster
might, without hostile intent or volition, challenge
core security interests and thus, might require defensespecific responses as a consequence is also a somewhat
new defense planning consideration.
What is clear by now is the idea that meaningful
competition with and resistance to the United States
are already straying increasingly away from the
traditional military domain. Likewise, purpose and
volition are no longer essential components in any
definition of consequential strategic challenges.
Meaningful adjustment to these core findings is
essential to DoD’s future relevance. This requires that
the Department of Defense study and orient against
fundamentally different strategic priorities than those
that dominated post-Cold War defense strategy and
planning. To NDS 05’s framers, should the United
States fail to adjust to these conditions, adverse strategic
costs would accumulate in real and profound ways,
ultimately limiting American freedom of action. It was
increasingly clear that, if the United States was to lose
its position, it was more likely to “die by a thousand
cuts” than succumb to sudden traditional military
reversal at the hands of a near-peer competitor.
Thus, NDS 05’s framers believed that the United
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States should actively secure its position and interests
against persistent competition, resistance, and friction.
In short, there was mounting evidence—most recently
from the War on Terrorism—that traditional American
military superiority (transformed or not) was necessary
but not sufficient for success in an environment rife
with irregular-cum-catastrophic and hybrid challenges.
Conventional wisdom was put to the test in both Iraq
and Afghanistan. In each instance, American military
power overwhelmed organized resistance to the extent
it existed, but was patently un- or under-prepared to
“seal the strategic deal.”
NDS 05’s working-level strategists believed that
the United States was assuming increasing risk in
areas where recent history had consistently proven
it most vulnerable. The United States had repeatedly
demonstrated its obvious capacity to dispatch with the
organized military forces of competitor states. This was
not necessarily so when it faced determined irregular
resistance, however.
Furthermore, American mettle had not yet been
fully tested in an environment certain to be defined
by extended periods of persistent engagement in
overlapping, violent contingencies where the United
States confronted an array of capable nonstate and
state competitors under conditions of considerable
operational ambiguity. In this environment, the United
States operated inside a band of constant, unrelenting
resistance and friction. Within it, a range of discrete
competitors applied innovative cost-imposing strategies to limit U.S. influence.
To those responsible for developing NDS 05, the
environment would never universally conform to a
pre-conflict, war, and post-conflict model where DoD
ramps-up capabilities, fights high-intensity military
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engagements, and then resets or withdraws after
successfully ceding primary responsibility for final
conflict resolution to other U.S. Government agencies.
Instead, DoD was now elemental to a persistent wholeof-government effort to manage consequential politicosecurity competition and resistance perpetually in real
time. If a revolution in understanding was to occur
in this regard, it would only happen after substantial
intellectual reprogramming. Thus, those who drafted
NDS 05 undertook the modest and admittedly
incomplete but nonetheless important and timely
articulation and socialization of the four challenges.
The challenge concept was not the product of radical
futurist thinking. Admittedly, some of the challenges
were less well-developed. The disruptive challenge
for example—not discussed in any real detail in this
monograph—is the least well-defined and the most
speculative of them all. However, collectively, the
challenges were grounded in a number of thoughtful
post-Cold War strategic assessments predating
9/11. One for example, the 1999 report New World
Coming: American Security in the 21st Century by the
U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
seemed to allude to the irregular, catastrophic, and
disruptive challenges specifically when it concluded:
(F)or many years to come Americans will become
increasingly less secure, and much less secure than they
now believe themselves to be. That is because many of
the threats emerging in our future will differ significantly
from those of the past, not only in their physical but
also in their psychological effects. While conventional
conflicts will still be possible, the most serious threat
to our security may consist of unannounced attacks
on American cities by sub-national groups using
genetically engineered pathogens. . . . Other threats may
inhere in assaults against an increasingly integrated
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and complex, but highly vulnerable, international
economic infrastructure. . . . Threats may also loom from
the unraveling of the fabric of national identity itself,
and the consequent failure or collapse of several major
countries.155

In the 3 years since the challenges were first
introduced, there have been numerous other attempts
to classify or define the current security era. The most
recent is the concept of “the long war.”156 It is true that
the United States is at the front end of a long, irregular
(and potentially catastrophic) conflict with a web of
determined extremist opponents. In the author’s view,
it is not true, however, that the “long war,” as it is
narrowly described, constitutes by itself the totality of
active, hostile competition and resistance to the United
States. The “long war” concept by itself is an incomplete
and dangerous characterization of the environment.
Indeed, the “long war” against radical jihadists, as it is
conceived by security and defense leaders in and out
of uniform, is only one aspect of a complex mosaic of
non-state and state competition and resistance.
Adherence to the “long war” concept as definitive
artificially limits meaningful consideration of the
full range of opponents certain to aggressively push
back (politically, economically, socially, and at times
quite violently) against American primacy. To define
the current security era as one populated solely by
disaggregated, nonstate terrorist threats, for example,
ignores what NDS 05’s working-level strategists
believed was the near-certainty that the United States
would engender substantial resistance from wideranging irregular, catastrophic, and hybrid sources.
Further still, to the extent that violent irregular-cumcatastrophic resistance is perceived to work, “otherthan-jihadist,” nonstate opponents will certainly be
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tempted to employ it against perceived American
encroachment. The “long war” concept simply breeds a
naïve, myopic focus on Muslim-inspired terrorism and
terrorists. And, it does so at the expense of thoughtful
evaluation of other consequential sources of meaningful
resistance. Rigid focus on the Islamic terrorist or
insurgent threat by defense strategists hazards gross
oversimplification of a larger, more fundamental longterm challenge universe. This broader collection of
physical and political threats is certain to actively test
American primacy for as long as it endures.
Some discrete challenges will arise from purposeful resistance—predictable, systemic antibodies to
American primacy. Others will originate in environmental discontinuities triggered by globalization and
the attendant dissolution of key aspects of the
sovereign state system. Regardless of origin or purpose,
however, all will test American primacy in unique
ways. The successful defense of American position
in this environment relies on the nation’s ability to
assess its relative strengths and vulnerabilities; gauge
the appropriate role for the various instruments of
power; and then effectively employ its power in
sophisticated combinations to prevent or reverse
adverse strategic outcomes. In a word, it requires
real strategic calculation and design where strategists
are forced to apply the nation’s finite resources with
some discrimination and precision against a seemingly
infinite set of consequential hazards.
This may mean dispensing with a great deal
of tradition in the defense establishment. Given
obvious American leverage in the traditional domain,
current circumstances demand a more sophisticated
understanding of and adjustment to less-than-traditional
sources of meaningful resistance and competition.
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It just may be that without this more sophisticated
appreciation of the environment, American defense
and security policymakers will continue to focus on the
most obvious, conventional, and manageable security
challenges. To the extent they do so, they likely will fail
to devote requisite energy to development of effective
counters for those challenges that are sometimes less
apparent and more unconventional in military terms,
but are, nonetheless, infinitely more dangerous given
current U.S. vulnerabilities.
Articulation of the challenge concept was intended
to force DoD into detailed consideration of a world
populated by relentless, disaggregated, defenserelevant challenges to American power and influence.
Perpetual competition and friction in this world are
often, at their core, nonmilitary in origin and character.
While any single manifestation within it has defenserelevant components, very few are either exclusively
or even primarily solvable through defense-specific
or military means. This is particularly true to the
extent that resistance and friction are more irregular,
catastrophic, hybrid, or in the future, disruptive in
character.
This more complex challenge environment
demands that American strategists nimbly apply
the nation’s diverse instruments of power in those
combinations likeliest to render decisive, enduring
outcomes. Clearly, this requires more than DoD and
its resources alone. Nonetheless, DoD was the first
to recognize the increased scope and complexity
of the environment’s constituent hazards. Thus, it
bears significant responsibility for translating the key
implications of these hazards into concepts suitable
for wider U.S. Government consumption. Likewise,
DoD must itself adjust to the environment’s unique
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demands and simultaneously lead more comprehensive
government-wide change in this regard. It will be
some time before the interagency adjusts to the new
(or better understood) strategic reality. In the mean
time, DoD must compensate for the wider American
government’s halting recognition of the environment’s
fundamental transformation and, at a minimum, help
it correctly frame the most important security- and
defense-relevant choices.
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